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The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship
between collective bargaining for public school principals and
principals' perceptions of their working conditions.
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Specifically,
working

this study examined the perceptions of

conditions

for

a

sample

of

principals

who

had

statutory authority to bargain collectively (Washington) and
a

sample

(Oregon).

of principals who

did

not have

such

authority

This type of study can make a contribution to the

knowledge base

for

behavior

governance

and

educational

leadership,

dynamics

administrative

within

educational

organizations.
Methodologically,
survey

research

gathering

from

this

design.
a

descriptive
Survey

relatively

particular point in time.

study

research

large

utilized

permits

number of

cases

a

data
at

a

This research strategy focuses

primarily upon the generalized characteristics of a population
rather than individual characteristics.

The population for

this study were principals in Oregon (908)
(1102) •

and Washington

The instrumentation for data collection was The

School Principal's Working Conditions Questionnaire which was
mailed to a sample of one hundred principals in Oregon and one
hundred in Washington.

The return rate for Oregon was sixty-

seven (67) percent and eighty (80) percent for washington.
Seventy-three and one half (73.5) percent of the principals
responded to the questionnaire.
Nine sub-scales were used to measure determinants of
principal's working conditions:

1)

of formal written contracts,

3)

authority,

6)

5)

job security,

salary,

2)

existence

autonomy,

4)

power and

fringe benefits,

7)

role
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definition,

8)

school boards, and

communications with superintendents
9)

and

involvement in decision making.

The data analysis compared responses of two principals
groups;

an

analysis

of

variance

was

used

to

significant differences between the two groups means.

identify
A major

conclusion of the study was that there was no significant
difference in perceptions of working conditions for the two
groups of principals.
working

Of the nine determinants of principals'

conditions,

only

autonomy

was

found

to

be

significantly more positive for non-bargaining principals.
Non-bargaining principals (Oregon) perceived that they
have greater autonomy in their management roles than do the
bargaining principals.

An explanation for this finding may

be that Oregon Principals, although they have no impact on
district collective bargaining processes, have a considerable
amount of discretion in managing their schools and they have
an

impact

upon

teaching

behavior

and

student

learning

outcomes.
A

secondary

data

analysis

compared

the

level

of

bargaining - formal, informal, and unilateral decision making
to nine determinants of principal's working conditions.

This

analysis found salary (.001), involvement in decision making
(.03), job security (.013), and fringe benefits (.016) to be
statistically

significant.

The group

of

principals

who

indicated they formally bargain had a significantly higher
mean

score

than

the

informal

collective

bargaining

or

4

unilateral decision making groups.
there may be a

This finding suggests

positive relationship between adequacy of

salary, formal collective bargaining, and higher levels of job
satisfaction.
wi th
security

regard
and

to

involvement

in

benefits,

the

fringe

decision

making,

informal

job

bargaining

principals' group had a significantly higher mean score than
the formal bargaining and unilateral decision making groups.
The

informal

bargaining

group

perceived

that

they

were

involved in decision making processes more often or to a
greater extent than principals in the formal and unilateral
decision making groups.

These decisions include policies and

procedures which effect job security and fringe benefits.
Consequently the higher scores for principals in the informal
decision making group may be reflective of their participation
in an inter-active "administrative team" model.
This study's findings has implications for legislative
bodies

who

are

developing

bargaining statutes.
inform local
practices

for

and/or

amending

collective

In addition, the study's findings can

policy makers as

they develop policies

and

involvement of principals in matters which

relate to working conditions.
School district officials who have the responsibility for
policy implementation can benefit from the knowledge that
formalized
possible

collective
salary

bargaining

issues)

may

(with

not

be

the

exception

of

as

important

as

5

establishing structures and processes for including principals
in decision making.
In

summary,

the

major

finding

that

there

is

no

significant difference in perceptions of working conditions
for the non-bargaining and bargaining principal groups, has
powerful implications for the collective bargaining movement
and for principals in the Northwest.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Collective bargaining has become an integral part of
American public education governance.
school

However, treatment of

supervisors and administrators

in public education

collective bargaining differs from private sector bargaining.
Private

sector

supervisors

and

managerial

employees

are

unrepresented in the collective bargaining process.
Public

school

administrators

in

states,

such

as

Minnesota, New York and Massachusetts (Pisapia, 1980), have
engaged in collective bargaining, with statutory protection.
Conversely,

public

education

Pennsylvania and Wisconsin,

administrators

in

Florida,

have been denied the right to

engage in collective bargaining by statutes which specifically
exclude supervisors and administrators from the protection
offered to teachers (Pisapia, 1980).
The number of public school principals who collectively
bargain has increased during the past decade (Nasstrom and
Pier,

1983).

Some observers believe the acceleration of

administrative bargaining in public education will continue
at its current rate of increase (Nasstrom and Pier, 1983).
Twenty five years ago unions of administrators were nonexistent (Cooper, 1979) and the attitude and acceptance of the
legitimacy of administrative collective bargaining was unified
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against bargaining rights for administrators (Cooper, 1979).
The number of administrator bargaining units is still on
the increase in a

few geographical areas.

Recently,

the

Philadelphia Association of School Administrators voted to
join the teamsters to "aid the principals in getting a fair
and

equitable

contract"

subsequently become
district

over

concerns.

a

two

Presently,

locked
year

(Rodman,
in a
period

They

1986).

dispute wi th
on

the

salaries

and

have
school
other

Pennsylvania state law guarantees no

right to administrative collective bargaining (Rodman, 1986),
but does provide a legal right to strike.
Oregon excludes supervisors from inclusion under its
Collective Bargaining Act.

This exclusion is accomplished by

a description of those defined by the Act as public employees.
The law describes a public employee as "an employee of a
public

employer

but

does

not

include

elected

officials,

persons appointed on boards or commissions or persons who are
confidential employees or supervisory employees"

(State of

Oregon, 1982).
The law describes a Supervisory employee as:
any individual having authority in the interest of the
employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other
employees, or having responsibility to direct them, or
to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend
such action, if in connection with, the exercise of such
authority is not merely routine or clerical in nature,
but requires the use of independent judgement. However,
the function of authority enumerated in the sUbsection
does not necessarily require the conclusion that the
individual exercising that function is a supervisor
within the meaning of ORS 240.060 (Oregon Revised

3

statutes, 1982, p. 37).
In Oregon, supervisory status is not established by title
in the law but by the specific functions of the position
within the organization.

A title in one school district may

be a supervisory position whereas the same title in another
district would not be a supervisory position.
While Oregon excludes administrators' bargaining rights
through the definition of public employee, a Washington state
statute

excludes

superintendent

only

and

the

directors

grants

superintendent,
of

business

administrators,

assistant

by

definition.

with

supervisory

Washington

state

authority,

bargaining rights through inclusion within the

definition of "public employee" (Pisapia, 1980).
This statute prohibits "managerial II bargaining
through categorical and definitional schemes.
Washington statute does not exclude bargaining by
administrators falling outside of these categories,
nor does it provide specific definitions of
supervisors,
unless they fall
outside of a
bargaining unit.
It only prohibits managerial
bargaining through specific categorical exclusions
(Pisapia, 1980, p. 68).
The statute's purpose is to prescribe certain rights and
obligations of the educational employees of school districts
in the

state of Washington,

and to

establish procedures

governing the relationship between these employees and their
employers. They are designed to meet the special requirements
and

needs

of

public

employment

Washington, 1975, 1st ex.s.c 288
to

define

the

term

"employee

in
2.).

education

(state

of

The statute goes on

organization"

to

mean

any

4

organization, union, association, agency, committee, council,
or group of any kind in which employees participate, and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, for collective
bargaining with employers.
The terms "employee" and "educational employee"
mean any certificated employee of a school district,
except:
(a)
The chief executive officer of the
employer, (b) The chief administrative officers of
the employer, which shall mean the superintendent
of
the
district,
deputy
superintendents,
administrative assistants to the superintendent,
assistant superintendents, and business manager.
Title variation from all positions enumerated in
this subsection (b)
may be appealed to the
commission for determination of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the term "educational employee"
(state of Washington, 1975).
understanding

the

differences

between principals who choose,

in

working

conditions

or are allowed,

to bargain

collectively and those who do not, may provide insight into
the

human

relations

of

future

organizational

governance

dynamics within education in the United states.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The role of school principals in a school district is
that of middle manager.
their

status

as

Yet, questions arise with regard to

management

or

supervisory

personnel

or

something all together different.
Middle level managers, in many school districts, do not
have similar access to negotiated decision making as do their
subordinates

(teachers)

who

are

involved

bargaining (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).

in

collective

This decision making

5

process with respect to wages, benefits and self-interest is
an acceptable practice in a majority of public and private
sector

work

places.

Upper

management

(boards

and

superintendents) tend to hold more tightly to unilateral onesided decision making due to negative attitudes produced as
an outgrowth of teacher bargaining.

A heal thy organizational

climate is premised on "trust" (Likert, 1967).
indicate

principals

excluded

from

Evidence would

direct

input

or

participation in a process for determining wages and fringe
benefits, will be less likely to accept and understand the
motives and intentions of the school board (Caldwell, 1983).
It seems incongruous that principals -- instructional
leaders accountable for the welfare and educational growth of
the nation's youth

should in some school distr icts be

excluded from meaningful participation in matters impacting
directly on their personal welfare (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).
Due process,

according to Oregon and Washington state

law, affords a level of job security to principals.

Certain

job requirements, e.g. teacher evaluation procedures, in which
they have less direct input than the teachers, make contracts
difficult to administer.

Principals are evaluated and have

less authority in developing the process and contract than
their subordinates.

Principals are "caught in the middle".

They do not have direct access to formalized channels of input
with

their

governing

boards

conditions of their work.

in

defining

the

terms

and

6

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The

most

often

claimed

advantages

to

principals

bargaining involves both personal and organizational benefits.
Principals may receive higher salaries and better fringe
benefits:

more

extensive

employment

rights:

seniority

provisions in case of lay-offs: better communication with the
superintendent and the school board: greater authority on the
job:

and opportuni ties to achieve resolution

disputes through effective grievance procedures.

on

internal

Presumably,

districts become more efficient and compatible organizations
by their inclusion.
Collective bargaining fails, according to some, in its
organizational impact.

Principals have less authority and

greater breakdowns with superordinates in communication, as
well as more conflict and greater difficulties in resolving
disputes

(Nasstrom

and

"administrative team"

Pier,

1983).

concept feel

Proponents

of

the

these to be the major

victims of principals' rights to collectively bargain.

The

adversarial aspects of bargaining make achieving the purposes
of an "administrative team" impossible.
Collective bargaining for administrators in Oregon and
Washington differs according to the statutes in place in each
state.

Comparing principals' perceptions of their working

conditions through a sample of principals permitted bargaining
rights and a sample of those not permitted such rights could

7

provide

clearer

direction

to

those

involved

in

the

establishment of state statutes affecting bargaining rights.
In addition, this comparison may provide insight into future
administrative structures for school districts in Washington
and Oregon.
This study examined the perceptions of public school
principals

in

perceptions

of

Oregon

and

working

Washington

conditions

regarding

and

their

analyzed

the

relationships between principals' perceptions and the ability
to collectively bargain.

This study also investigated the

degree of formality in bargaining and whether it impacts these
perceptions.
The perceptions of working conditions were determined by
examining nine determinants:
1.

Salary - Adequacy of Salaries

2.

Formal Contracts - Existence of written
contracts, policy statements, or memoranda of
understanding and agreement

3.

Autonomy - Principals authority over teachers
and school building activities

4.

Power' and Authority - Specific statements of
principal's decision making areas

5.

Job Security - Specific seniority provisions,
grievance procedures

6.

Fringe Benefits - Professional membership
dues, paid and unpaid leave policies, and release
for professional growth

7.

Role Definition - Statement of both the board's
and principal's rights and responsibilities

8

8.

Communications with board/superintendent Effectiveness of principal's communication and
ease of resolution of disputes between board/
superintendents

9.

Involvement in decision making - The extent
to which principals are involved in setting policy
(Williams, 1985, p. 2)
DEFINITION OF TERMS

For the purposes of this study, the following operational
definition of major terms are:
Collective Bargaining - the mutual obligation of the PUblic
employer and the exclusive bargaining representative, to
meet, confer and negotiate in good faith, and to execute
a written agreement with respect to grievance procedures,
and collective negotiations on personnel matters,
including wages, hours, and working conditions which may
be peculiar to an appropriate bargaining unit of such
public employer (State of Oregon, 1982).
Administrators
public education officials with any
responsibility for or having authority in the interest
of an employer, to hire, assign, promote, transfer,
layoff, recall, suspend, discipline, or discharge other
employees, or to adjust their grievances, or to recommend
effectively such action when such action is not merely
routine or clerical in nature but calls for the
consistent exercise of independent judgement (State of
Washington, 1975, 1st ex.s.c 288).
Principal - public education administrator with responsibility
for a school building and all it's functions inclusive
of the evaluation of certificated employees specifically
elementary school principal, junior high or middle school
principal and senior high school principal (State of
Washington, 1975).
Perceptions - awareness of the elements of the environment
through direct or intuitive recognition; the integration
of impression of events derived from past experience and
serving as a basis for or as verified by further
meaningful motivated action (Webster, 1986, p. 1675).

9

Working Conditions:
1.

Salary - Adequacy of Salaries

2.

Formal Contracts - Existence of written contracts,
policy statements, or memoranda of understanding
and agreement

3.

Autonomy - Principals authority over teachers and
school building activities

4.

Power and Authority - Specific statements of
principal's decision making areas

5.

Job Security - Specific seniority provisions,
grievance procedures

6.

Fringe Benefits - Professional membership dues,
paid and unpaid leave policies, and release for
professional growth

7.

Role Definition - Statement of both the board's
and principal's rights and responsibilities

8.

Communications with board/superintendent Effectiveness of principal's communication and
ease of resolution of disputes between board/
superintendents

9.

Involvement in decision making - The extent to
which principals are involved in setting policy
(Williams, 1985, p. 2)
HYPOTHESIS

The

research

indicates

collective

bargaining

for

educational administrators is afforded to middle managers, at
least in a permissive process, in school districts in thirtyone (31)

states (Cooper and Nakamura,

1983).

Washington's

statutes allow for this process, but Oregon statutes deny the
formalized process.

10
For

this

study,

it

was

hypothesized

principals'

perceptions of their working conditions do not significantly
differ

even

though

statutes

regarding

the

collective

bargaining rights of principals in both states differ greatly.
The trend in public education is toward an increase in
administrator
1976).

collective

bargaining

(Bridges

and

Cooper,

This study provided additional insights into these

issues for educators and legislators of other states who are
also

concerned

with

the

phenomenon

of

administrative

unionization within public education.
SCOPE
This study was limited to a
school principals (K -

12)

random sample of public

in the states of Washington and

Oregon who serve solely as building level administrators.

The

perceptions of principals rather than actual level of salaries
and fringe benefits were studied.

As Caldwell and Paul's

(1983) previous evidence suggests, the process through which
working conditions such as salaries are determined may be more
crucial to the organization because job satisfaction is not
always tied to monetary benefits.
The sample for this study included one hundred

(100)

principals in Oregon and one hundred

(100)

principals

in

Washington representing a ten percent

(10%)

sample of the

total popUlation available for study.
Data for the study were collected between February and

11
March 1988.
Working
Williams

The research instrument,

Conditions
(1985)

Questionnaire",

and Morris

(1985)

"School Principals'

developed orginally by
and

combined

for

this

investigation, was used for the data collection activities
( See Appendix

B).

There are

several

1 imi tat ions

of this

study:
1.

This study is confined to perceptions of the

working conditions of school principals in the states
of Oregon and Washington.
2.

To maximize a true representation of the

population, principals surveyed were randomly chosen.
3.

No attempt was made to survey the perceptions or

attitudes of school district top management with regard
to principals' working conditions.
4.

This study only examines perceptions of working

conditions by school principals and the effects of
collective bargaining on their perceptions.
5.

This study did not examine the attitude of school

principals toward collective bargaining, nor the
effects of collective bargaining on principals' working
conditions, nor the actual working conditions of
principals.
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SUMMARY

This study focused on collective bargaining as a defined
and structural approach affecting principals' perceptions of
their working conditions and thus influencing the operation
of

their

educational

administrator

groups

organizations.
have

attempted

In
to

many

states,

improve

working

conditions by lobbying for collective bargaining rights.
Chapter I reviews how Oregon and Washington differ with
regard to principals I

statutory authority to collectively

bargain and the perceived impact of collective bargaining on
working conditions.

Nine catagories of working conditions

were defined and the concepts utilized in this study were
operationally defined.
In Chapter II, the historical development of the American
labor movement

is traced and specific studies

related to

collective bargaining and school principals are reviewed.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
organization theory and the history of the American labor
movement

have

principals
bargaining.

to

greatly
organize

influenced
for

the

the

right

purpose

of

of

school

collective

This chapter reviews this history and selected

previous studies in this field.

This chapter is divided into

the following sections:
1.

Concepts of Organizations
a. Working Conditions
b. The Concept of Authority
c. The Concept of Power
d. Exchange Theory
e. Early Collective Organization
f. The Concept of Collective Bargaining

2.

The Historical Background of Collective
Bargaining in the United states

3.

A Review of Federal Law Related to Federal
Employee Collective Bargaining

4.

A Review of the Development of Collective
Bargaining in Public Education

5.

A Review of the Development of Collective
Bargaining in Oregon and Washington

6.

A Review of Research Related to Collective
Bargaining and School Principals
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CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATIONS
Working Conditions
Caldwell

and

Paul

(1983)

state

Maslow

(1954)

and

Herzburg's (1966) theories support the need for principals to
achieve higher order need satisfactions.

Maslow's theory is

based on the idea that motivation is an internal force which
cannot be imposed by external effort.
seeking to satisfy a

People are continually
Maslow states

hierarchy of needs.

managers should strive to create an environment
employees can achieve

in which

self actualization and the maximum

effectiveness permitted by one's abilities and skills (Lutrin,
1985).

Frederich Herzberg found that contented workers derive

satisfaction directly from

job satisfiers and motivators.

These

the

motivators

responsibility,
growth.

include

achievement,

itself

recognition,

as

well

advancement

as
and

Unhappy workers found dissatisfaction from the job

context and hygiene factors.
factors

work

According to Lutrin (1985) these

relate to Maslow's lower levels of need

(working

conditions, interpersonal relationships, salary, status, job
security) which must be satisfied before self actualization
can be achieved (see Figure 1).

When school boards openly

discuss with principals and act on relevant concerns such as
wages, role definition, autonomy and scope of authority, it
may enhance in principals a greater sense of professional
recognition and esteem (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).
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~

ACTUALIZATION
ESTEEM
BELONGINGNESS
AND LOVE

SAFETY

Figure 1.

Maslow's hierarchy of need.

The Concept of Authority
Talcott Parsons defines authority as an aspect of power
in a system of social interaction.

It is institutionalized

power over others (Parsons, 1954).
Authority is a formal concept and comes from a formal
organization

(Hicks,

1967).

From the basic definition of

authority, as a right to act or direct the actions of others,
two characteristics are given:

(1) authority is a right and

(2) as a result of possessing the right, one is entitled and
obligated

directly

or

indirectly

to

act.

A

third

characteristic is implied and involves the power to employ
penalties or sanctions so that a desired action is completed
(Bierstedt, 1964).
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The Concept of Power
Power

is

a

broad

concept

confined to organizations.

which

is

not

necessarily

It is neither completely formal

nor informal in nature, though it can be influenced by factors
including an individual's ethical and moral considerations
(Sisk, 1979).
According to Max Weber, power is the probability that one
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to
carry out his own will despite resistance (Weber, 1947).

"The

ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done,"
according to Gerald P. Salanch and Jeffrey Pfeffer (Salancih
and Pfeffer, 1977, p. 17).

Power is the ability of a person

to do something measured in terms of his or her ability to (1)
give reward,

(2) promise rewards,

current rewards,

(3)

threaten to withdraw

(4) withdraw current rewards,

(5) threaten

punishment, or (6) punish (Hicks, 1967).
It

is

actualize

the
its

interference,
within

the

realistic

interests
command

context

capacity

(attain goals,

respect,
of

of

a

system-unit

prevent

undesired

control possessions,

system-interaction

and

to

to

etc.)
exert

influence on processes in the system (Parsons, 1954).
Exchange Theory - Power and Authority
At the base of self actualization are human needs and
pleasures which have their roots in social life.
think

of

power,

professional

recognition,

Whether we
or

sociable
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companionship, the comforts of family life or the challenge
of

competitive

sports,

the

gratifications

experienced

individuals are contingent upon the actions of others.

by
The

rewards individuals obtain in social associations entail a
cost to other individuals, not to the point in which the gains
of some depends upon the losses of others, but rather that
individuals associate with one another because they all profit
from the social association.

They do not all profit equally

nor do they share the cost of providing the benefits equally.
The fact that furnishing benefits to others

produces social

rewards is a major reason people often go to great lengths to
help associates and enjoy doing so (Blau, 1978).
Individuals strive to achieve diverse objectives.
idea

of

selecting

the

most

preferred

among

The

available

alternatives does not imply the one chosen always yields the
greatest

material

alternative

that

profit

(Blau,

1978).

requires

making

material

Choice

of

sacrifices

an
but

contributes most to the attainment of some ideal, may be their
objective.

Even in this choice errors may occur.

to anticipate,
others

will

in advance,

reciprocate

the social rewards with which

in

exchange

brings uncertainty and errors.
assumption that men

The need

seek to

relations

inevi tably

Given this situation,
adjust

social

conditions

the
to

achieve their ends is realistic and inescapable (Blau, 1978).
The basic social processes governing associations among
people are rooted in simple psychological processes such as
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the underlining feelings of people and their desires
various

kinds

of

rewards.

The

psychological

needs

for
of

individuals determines which rewards are important and to whom
they

are

attracted.

This

mutual

attraction

anticipating the association will be rewarding.

depends

on

The process

of social attraction leads to the process of social exchange.
This situation occurs frequently when one individual needs
something another has to offer, such as help in work but has
nothing the other needs in reciprocation for that help.

The

person in need of the recurrent services forces the other to
help,

gaining help

without the help.
alternatives,

from

another

source

or getting along

If unwilling to choose any of these

individuals

must

subordinate

themselves

to

others and comply with their wishes, thereby rewarding the
individual with power as an inducement for furnishing the
needed assistance.
Exchange
power.

processes

give

rise

to

differentiations

of

A person who commands services others need, attains

power over others by making the satisfaction of their need
contingent on their compliance.

An employer can make workers

comply because they are dependent on the wages received.
There are differences in the dynamics of this power in a
collective situation and the power of one individual over
another.

Collective approval of power legitimatizes power and

its disapproval brings opposition.
specific forms of social organization emerge as a result
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of the process
patterns

of

of exchange and competition

conduct

relations adjust.

by

individuals

Power

and

in which the

groups

and their

is the resource which makes

it

possible to direct and coordinate the activities of people
(Blau, 1978).
Stable

organizing

power

needs

legitimation

and

an

important function of legitimate authority is to organize
collective effort on a large scale in the pursuit of commonly
accepted ends.

Union organizations are designed to further

the common objectives of their memberships.
The organization of collective effort mobilizes power.
Power can mean different things to different people, but is
based on the action of people in social associations and their
social exchanges.
Early Collective organizations
organization
effort.

Man is by nature a political animal (Cresswell and

Murphy, 1976).
"polis" ,

involves the coordination of collective

Political - that all men tend to gather in a

in a natural grouping where through a process of

politics in a

politz,

to work out their policies.

This

assumes man is instinctively and by nature a herd animal, a
creature of the polis, congregating compulsively with those
of his kind (Cresswell and Murphy, 1976).
In the ancient cities of Sumeria, the priesthood was the
first class to organize, the warriors formed their "union"
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called the
colegii:
also

nobility

and

the

professionals

especially

among

the

the

Lesser occupations

medicine, teaching, and law.

organized,

organized

more

skilled

labor

aristocracy.
In ancient Mesopotamia, citizens working for the temple
organized

in groups.

Among the

early Hebrews,

employed in the same craft formed clans (guilds).

families
In ancient

Greece a craft belonged to a family or clan, and in Rome there
were colegic of occupational groups that gave them force in
time of need for safeguarding their common interests.

In

Medieval Europe, guilds were organized to aid members as they
became

more

interested

organizations

probably

in
had

economics.

All

grievances,

of

these

complaints,

work

stoppages and social pressuring but the continuing reason for
these organizations were the "communal compulsion" (Cresswell
and Murphy, 1976)
societies

with

of the like to work together.
caste

systems,

the

coming

In early

together

or

organizing of people in a craft or trade was relatively easy
but in more fluid and open societies,
states,

the

(Cresswell

coming
and

together

Murphy,

1976)

of

the

has

such as the Uni ted
"occupational

been

more

clan"

difficult.

Whenever any sector of the labor force becomes sufficiently
aware of its collective presence and power, it sooner or later
organizes (Cresswell and Murphy, 1976).
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Collective Bargaining
Under a historic concept of governmental sovereignty, top
management was obligated to make use of a proper balance
between the rights of its employees and the greater common
welfare of the public.

The engagement

in the bilateral

process of determining conditions and terms of work for middle
management was discouraged (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).
The suspicion that workers are unable to show sound
judgement in issues and matters relating to their personal
welfare as organizational climate becomes more structured and
formalized, grows stronger as a consequence of the collective
negotiations process and is not in alignment with research
findings.

The idea that the organization becomes increasingly

strained, bureaucratic and adversarial and is not founded with
current findings
1973).

(Kanner,

1977;

Karlitz,

1978,

and Smith,

Caldwell's data appears to indicate perceptions of

workers can be positively influenced through a
bargaining approach.

collective

This approach should be mutually defined

and structured, in establishing aspects of work relationships
including monetary compensations (Caldwell, 1983).

Sdxol

principals,

their

today,

often

experience

doubts

about

leadership style as our nation's schools suffer a serious loss
of public confidence, as articles and studies have emerged
about violence in the schools, drugs, and declining student
achievement (Dwyer, et al, 1987).

The school principal has

been thrust into the very center of the troubled educational
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arena by those who have studied "effective schools" (Edmonds,
1979).

The erosion of the public I s

commitment makes

difficult for a principal to effectively manage a
community

factors

such

as

lack

of

parental

it

school.

support

for

programs, lack of tax funds, and insufficient budget resources
all reflect a

decline of public confidence in the school

system (Pinkey, 1980 and Williams, 1985).

Goldhammer (1971)

found principals complained their power and autonomy as school
leaders has decreased (Dwyer, 1987).
To counteract this

loss of status and control,

many

principals have chosen to engage in collective bargaining
activities, formed independent unions and even affiliated with
the Teamsters and AFL-CIO (Williams, 1985 and Yeager, 1974).
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE
UNITED STATES
The
Industrial

trade

movement

Revolution

and

guild

following

the

charters
Civil

during
War

are

the
the

precursors of collective bargaining in the united States.
Labor shortages and the need for industrial expansion brought
about the formation of labor organizations.

Most early unions

were poorly organized and short lived, especially during times
of depression when any work was at a premium (Chamberlain,
1965).
In 1881,
founded.

the American Federation of Labor

(AFL)

was

The AFL was a group of skilled workers united to
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promote higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions
and the right to collectively bargain.

This union

is a

stronghold in the U. S • labor movement as it exists today.
This union's membership, as well as other unions, grew until
the great Depression of 1929 when a

decline

in American

unionism took place.
with
concern,

the

numbers

of unemployed workers

as

a

public

national attention focused on the formulation of

several federal, long term labor policies.

This focus was the

basis for most of the major federal labor relations statutes
generated and amended over the years.
The act having the greatest effect on organized labor was
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.

This act provides

protection of employee groups against employer influence and
makes it unfair for an employer to refuse to bargain with the
authorized representative of the employee.

All of the laws

beginning with the Railway Labor Act continuing through the
Labor

-

Management

Reporting

and

Disclosure Act

of

1959

continue to provide a basis for private sector collective
bargaining and a

legal basis for the relationship between

employers and workers.
As legislative labor activity increased in intensity,
public employees demanded greater bargaining rights.

The

American Association of School Administrators (AASA) reported
in 1966, that 110 (one-hundred ten) teachers' strikes occurred
between 1940 and 1962.

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy
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issued

Executive

Order

#10988,

"Employee

Management

Cooperation in the Federal Service" which, was perhaps, the
most important order in support of public employee bargaining.
This order provided all federal employees the opportunity to
bargain collectively (Hagburg and Levine, 1979).
THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW RELATED
TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Executive
membership

in

Order

#10988

did

labor organizations.

not

exclude

supervisor

The order guaranteed

federal employees the right to join organizations of their
choice, and these organizations were given informal, formal
or exclusive recognition depending upon the proportion of
eligible federal employees they represented.
section 1 (a) of "General Provisions" of the Kennedy order
read as follows:
Each employee of the executive branch of the Federal
Government has the right, freely and without fear of
penalty or reprisal, to form, join, and assist a labor
organization or to refrain from any such activity, and
each employee shall be protected in the exercise of this
right.
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Order, the right to assist a labor organization extends
to participation in the management of the organization
and acting for the organization in the capacity of an
organization representative, including presentation of
its views to officials of the executive branch, the
Congress, or other appropriate authority.
The head of
each agency shall take the action required to assure that
employees in the agency shall take the action required
to assure that employees in the agency are appraised of
their
rights
under
this
section,
and
that
no
interference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination is
practiced within his agency to encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization (Hungeford, 1982,
p. 9) •
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Executive Order #10988 stated collective agreements are
negotiated between representatives of federal employee groups
and

federal

agencies

working conditions.

relative

to

personnel

policies

and

The order also authorized arbitration of

grievances and contract interpretation or application.

It

prohibited recognition to organizations which asserted the
right to strike against the United states government.
Executive

order was

the

impetus

behind states

and

The
local

governments' development of collective bargaining techniques
(Lieberman, 1970).
Those organizational and barganining rights were further
advanced by another Executive Order, #11491, signed in 1969
by

President

Richard

M.

Nixon.

This

order

helped

to

coordinate, clarify, and strengthen Executive Order #10988.
The major

changes

and additions

related

to

an exclusive

recognition election; definition of "good faith" bargaining;
exclusion of supervisory personnel from joining an employee
group; prohibition of union shop, agency shop or maintenance
of membership; required financial disclosure; defined unfair
labor practices.
The Civil

Service Reform Act

of

1978

established

Federal Service Impasse Panel for the purpose of
resolution;

and

established

a

Federal

Labor

a

impasse

Relations

Authority to oversee the order's implementation (Hungerford,
Bischof, 1986).
The

Railway

Labor

Act

of

1926,

the

National

Labor
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Relations Act of 1935, The Executive order (along with the
implemented state and local labor laws) and the civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 provide the framework

for collective

bargaining in private and public sectors (See Figure 2).

State And Local
Government

Private Sector
Law

Railway
Labor Act
(RLA)

(RRs &
airlines)

National
Labor
Relations
Act

Federal
Sector

State & local
collective
bargaining
statutes

civil Service
Reform Act

1: Established
by state statute
ranging from
none to full

1: Limited
right to
bargain noneconomic
issues: no
right to
strike

1978

1935

1926

Collective
Bargaining
Process

1:

Full

collective
bargaining
rights

Figure 2.
domain.

1:

Full

collective
bargaining
rights

Framework of labor law in private and public

REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
The

first

formal

association

National Teacher's Association.

of

educators

was

the

Its merger with the National

Administrators group formed the National Education Association
(NEA) (Cooper, 1982). As private industry labor strengthened,
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was organized in
1916 to secure bargaining rights for teachers
1970).

(Lieberman,

Until the 1960's, the two organizations had some real
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differences.

One major difference was the AFT's exclusion of

administrators as part of their membership, while the NEA
allowed administrators to hold membership in the organization.
While the AFT focused its emphasis on the economic status of
teachers and proposed collective bargaining as early as 1935,
the NEA focused its attention on improving teaching until
1964.

After the early 1960' s, the differences between the two

organizations lessened and both were recognized as providing
the necessary support to collective bargaining.
1961

in

New

York,

and

1964

in

Cleveland

As early as
and

Detroit,

bargaining rights were won for these cities' teachers.

In

July of 1965, the Public Employees Relations Act (PERA) was
passed in Michigan.
some

type

of

By 1970, thirty-eight states had enacted

bargaining

or

meet-and-confer

legislation.

Collective bargaining in public education had become a reality
(Lieberman, 1970).
Presently,

all

public

sector

collective

bargaining

statutes authorize some form of bargaining by teachers and
educational workers (Jascourt, 1984).
the

South

although

and
even

West
in

are

there

these

areas

bargaining does take place.

no

Only in some areas of
bargaining

some

form

of

provisions,
collective

Most recently (1987), Illinois

and Ohio enacted the most comprehensive collective bargaining
provisions anywhere (Jascourt, 1984).

Education reforms are

not inconsistent with the principles underlying collective
bargaining.

The empowerment of teachers and principals wi thin
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an

educational

organization

cannot

help

but

bring

about

reforms within educational organizations.
REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
OREGON AND WASHINGTON
Public employees in Oregon enjoy collective bargaining
rights under the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act
(PECBA),

(State of Oregon, 1982).

PECBA was established by

the 1973 Oregon Legislative Session, but forerunners of this
comprehensive

collective

bargaining

existence since the early 1960' s
1982).

legislation

were

in

(Hungerford and Bischof,

Oregon's first public bargaining law was adopted in

1963 after unsuccessful attempts in 1959 and 1961.
legislation
teachers
framework

was

from
for

amended,
its

and

coverage

their

revisions
and

in

1965

removed

a

separate

established

representation.

The 1963

The

1973

PECBA

encompasses coverage for all public employees, including those
in school districts.

This lawaI tered the Oregon school Board

process related to making decisions with teachers about their
working conditions.
PECBA excludes supervisors from the provisions of the law
and,

therefore,

principals are not included in bargaining

units and are not represented in the collective bargaining
process.

Since its passage, there have been numerous cases

in which the Employment Relations Board

(ERB)

applied the

definition of supervisor to various administrative positions

~.
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and established a clear delineation of these positions.

The

supervisory status in Oregon is not established by title in
the law but by the
organization.

functions of the position within the

It appears clear the intent of PECBA is for

public employees to receive the benefits of coverage to the
greatest extent possible.

The act also makes clear the intent

of the legislature to exclude management (Thomas, 1981).
Washington state's Public Employee Collective Bargaining
Act

(PECBA)

workers.

went into effect in 1967 covering all public
state

operators

in

statutes

1961

and

originally

expanded

to

covered
cover

districts in 1963 and teachers in 1965.

toll

public

bridge
utility

The 1965 statute

required collective bargaining for teachers with exclusive
representation

awarded.

School

districts

and

the

State

Department of Public Instruction were required to develop
appropriate policies and rules.

No provisions were made for

unfair labor practices or strikes.

The final PECBA, in 1967,

provided mediation services by the state and was reviewed by
the PECBA committee

in 1971 to

include modifications for

greater efficiency of the law with amendments.
guidelines

for

administrators

collective
is

contained

bargaining
in

the

Revised Code of Washington Title 41:
Service

and

Employment

Pensions,
Relations

Chapter
Act,

for

State

The specific
teachers

of

and

Washington:

Public Employment, Civil

41.59.

prescribes

This

Educational

the

rights

and

obligations of educational employees of school districts of
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Washington

and

relationship

establishes

between

the

employees

procedures
and

governing

employers.

the

These

procedures are designed specifically for the needs of public
employment in education.
Chapter 41.59, Public Employees' Collective Bargaining,
is consistent with Washington statute as a whole regarding
bargaining.

It provides for the continued improvement of the

relationship between public employers and their employees by
requiring a uniform basis of implementation of the rights of
public employees to join labor organizations of their own
choosing, and to be represented by organizations in matters
concerning employment relations.
REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR
SCHOOL PRINCIPALS
Attitudes, perpetuated and nurtured through time, are not
readily dispelled even in the wake of clear evidence (Caldwell
and Paul, 1983).
practices

This is the case with many of the present

involving

principals

and

school

boards

in

the

resolution of issues related to job function, and personnel
policies

and

individual

benefits.

Resolving

especially those focusing on wage increment plans,

issues,
fringe

benefits and conditions of employment, are documented and set
within an adversarial structure (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).
Over the last twenty-five years some of the issues which
stir the greatest controversy in the labor movement occur in
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the

public

The

sector.

most

unique

of

these

are

the

collective bargaining rights of middle management personnel
in education.
with the signing of Executive Order #10988 (Hagberg and
Levine, 1979), federal workers became eligible to bargain with
management.

Bridges and Cooper (1976) in examining

state statutes,
commissions,
comparisons

noted analysis of rulings by state labor

.

phone
of

existing

interviews

teacher

and

with

state

administrator

officials,

contracts,

and

reviews of the limited literature on administrative bargaining
are the three maj or trends in collective bargaining for school
administrators:
1.

The granting of bargaining rights to teachers
is a necessary condition for granting similar
rights to administrators.

2.

The eligibility of administrators for
collective bargaining is more often determined by
job junction than job title.

3.

The scope of negotiations is similar for
administrators and teachers although the
actual provisions of the negotiated contracts for
the two groups show more striking differences than
similarities (Bridges and Cooper, 1976, p. 307).

Bargaining activity occurs

in thirty-one

(31)

states

(Cooper and Nakamura,

1983).

Seventeen of these provide

administrators

to

bargaining

access

the

enabling legislation, including Washington.
the

administrator

bargaining

units

are

process

through

More than 90% of
in

seven

states:

Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan, New Jersey,
New York, and Washington (Bridges and Cooper, 1977).
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As

of

1982,

collective

bargaining

between

school

principals and other mid-rank supervisors and school districts
occurred in about two-thousand one-hundred (2,100) cases in
thirty-one (31) states and the District of Columbia (Cooper
and Murrmann, 1982).
Theodore J.

Kowalski

in an article for The American

School Board Journal (1978), suggests Boards of Education are
pushing their administrators toward collective bargaining by
supplying

"unintentional

incentives

that

may

be

spurring

administrators into such actions" (Kowalski, 1978, pg. 35).
Dr. Norman Barea, in a National Association of Secondary
School Principals Bulletin (1978) suggests the following list
of principals' concerns as leading to organizing:
communications,

2)

Securi ty ,

3)

Due

Process,

1) Improved
4)

Improved

wages, 5) Procedures for resolving concerns, 6) Hours, and 7)
Other conditions of employment (Barea, 1978, p. 44).
From the point of view of collective bargaining, the role
of school boards and teachers appears clear.

The position of

principals in relation to these negotiations, however, is not
so

clear.

As

a

result,

there

is

frustration

among

administrators who see negotiations going on around them, but
rarely with them (Cunningham, 1968).
management

and

teachers,

in

Bargaining between top

which

principals

neither

participate nor are committed, has steadily undermined their
prerogatives.

Forty-five

(45%)

percent of the principals

participating in a study conducted by the NASB Journal staff

33
(Cooper, 1976) reported this one fact alone.
It is not surprising the formal collective bargaining
process

has

appeal

to

many

principals.

When

viewing

substantial gains in salary and other welfare issues made by
teachers,

principals

independence

feel

teachers

bargaining process.

anxious

develop

of

the

power

and

through

the

collective

Such results have appeal to principals

who are not completely satisfied with their working conditions
(Anderson, 1970).
A

study

Association

executed

by

the

in 1976 queried a

National

cross

School

section of U. S •

Canadian principals regarding labor relations.
percent

(48%)

seriously

at

superintendent.

Boards
and

Forty-eight

of those responding reported themselves as
odds

regularly

or

occasionally

with

their

Eighty-six percent (86%) reported being in

favor of state laws which guarantee their right to bargain
with a school board (Cooper and Nakamura, 1983).
In a study of over five hundred districts in Michigan,
LeCesne

(1980)

reported

a

positive

relationship

between

principals and other school personnel in districts with formal
negotiations.

It

concluded

principals

in

formalized

bargaining units view their relations with school boards,
superintendents and other management personnel more favorably
than those whose wages were determined through informal means,
or who had no input into decisions.
Based on a sample of over five-hundred (500) secondary
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principals, LeCesne's findings suggest more than the actual
level

of

salary,

the process

through which

salaries

are

determined may be more crucial in predicting job satisfaction.
Principals appear significantly more satisfied when they have
input or consultation into their salary determination.

One

study determined and supported the notion that all

input

raises

roles

satisfaction

levels

(Caldwell, et.al, 1981).
and

formal

increases

elements
the

over

participation

This suggests utilizing structural

in principal

positive

non

effects

and board
of

job

relationships

satisfaction

for

principals (LeCesne, 1980).
In a Michigan study (Caldwell, et aI, 1981), which had
a

sample size of five-hundred

resul ts

suggested the process

(500)

secondary principals,

through which

salaries

are

determined is more crucial to predicting job satisfaction than
the actual level of salary.

A positive correlation between

the degree of formalized interaction of principals with school
boards in determining compensation policies and principals'
perceived

level

of

role

satisfaction,

were

consistent with the earlier work of LeCesne

found

to

(1980).

be
The

LeCesne study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of
collective bargaining between principals and school boards.
A study was conducted by Sweeney and Rowedder (1982), and
surveyed

principals

in

Iowa,

where

principal

unions

are

prohibited by state statute and principals in Connecticut,
where more than

eighty

(80)

percent

of

school

districts
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bargain

with

attitudes

administrators,

toward

to

administrator

discover

the

unionism.

range

In

Iowa,

of
the

majority favored formal collective bargaining believing it
would

enhance

relationship

their
was

leadership

found

to

positions.

exist

A

between

direct

principals I

satisfaction with salaries and fringe benefits and their
attitudes toward formal collective bargaining.

principals who

reported below-average salaries and benefits were strongly
pro-union: those reporting above-average salaries and benefits
were not.

Secondary principals favored formal bargaining more

than elementary principals, and principals with one to five
years of experience were less supportive of unions than older,
more experienced colleagues.
In

Connecticut,

principals

reported

bargaining

had

increased their participation in decision making and that they
had regained some authority. They noted improved communication
with the superintendent and the board, clarification of their
roles

in the

enhanced

school

salaries

bargaining

system,

and

favorably

increased

benefits.

affected

their

job security,

They

also

morale

and

indicated

(Sweeney

and

Rowedder, 1980).
A Nasstrom and Pier (1983) study compared bargaining and
non-bargaining principals to ascertain granted employment
rights

and

personal

satisfactions

prerequisites of employment.

with

particular

A comparison was made on the

basis of five contractual or related agreement rights and five
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distinct aspects of personal satisfaction.

The investigation

of the contractual items rested on a null hypotheses that no
significant differences existed between contracts of those who
bargained and those who did not.
perceptions

was

guided

by

a

This

null

investigation of

hypotheses

significant statistical difference would exist.

that

no

A stratified

random sample was identified based on geographical and school
district population information.

The null hypotheses was

rejected

relative

based

differences.

on
No

the

findings

significant

differences

to

contractual

were

found

in

attitudes.
In

Pennsylvania,

a

state without

legal

mandate

for

collective bargaining, survey data were collected from three
hundred secondary principals

indicating seventeen percent

(17%) had some type of formalized procedure for presenting
self interest issues to school boards.

Nineteen percent (19%)

indicated some informal dialogue wi th their boards,
thirty percent

(30%)

had

informal

superintendents (Caldwell, 1983).

while

input only

with their

On this basis

thirty (30)

percent of all principals were excluded from any type of
dialogue with either their school board or superintendent in
matters relating to wages or working conditions.
study

design

employed

a

survey

methodology

Caldwell's
with

a

1983),

an

questionnaire format.
In a

comparison study

(Caldwell and Paul,

analysis of the actual agreements between middle management
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and school boards in Pennsylvania was undertaken.

In ten

percent (10%) of the documents, principals were provided with
specifically defined and written provisions relating to formal
procedures for input into wage and fringe benefit policies.
Caldwell and Paul concluded from this that many principals
depend on verbal understandings and have little or no input
into such decisions.
between

school

These data suggest the relationships

boards

and

their

building

managers

significantly varies along a continuum ranging from active
invol vement of principals relative to terms of employment
resulting in a definitive written agreement, to

unilateral

settings of personnel policies passively accepted (Caldwell
and Paul,

1983).

Where private and

federal

sectors

are

governed by one legal framework, public school labor relations
are controlled in at least thirty one states by collective
bargaining statutes (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).

The structure

of the bargaining relationship has been precipitated by these
state statutes.

The statutes governing educational collective

bargaining are diverse in nature.

Currently, seven of the

previous thirty-one states all deny administrators collective
bargaining rights.
The Pennsylvania study (Caldwell, et aI, 1981) confirms
earlier research findings on principals' participation in a
formally defined process for determining wages and benefits
as consistently enhancing organizational climate and improving
principal performance.
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A study conducted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania with all
building

level

administrators

determined

there

was

a

significant relationship between the existence of collective
bargaining for public school principals and their perceptions
of working conditions.
in

The study reveals principals involved

collective bargaining perceive

they

enjoy

significant

advantages over their non-bargaining counterparts (Williams,
1985).

This study identified nine determinants of working

conditions and each of these were examined individually in an
attempt

to

discover

significant

differences

between

perceptions of bargaining and non-bargaining principals.

the
One-

hundred (100) principals in New Jersey and one-hundred (100)
principals in Pennsylvania were surveyed with a return rate
of seventy-one (71%) percent.

For analyses, mean scores were

grouped and the T-test for significance was used between the
two groups as well as an analysis of the variance when the
three group means were studied.

The results confirmed a

higher degree of perceived satisfaction by principals who
bargain as compared to those who did not bargain.
In another study,

(Morris, 1985) the results indicated

principals organized for purposes of collective bargaining
realize better defined working conditions than their nonbargaining colleagues.
if

elementary

This study was undertaken to determine

principals

organized

for

the

purpose

of

collective bargaining possess better working conditions and
enjoy greater job satisfaction when compared to those who are
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not organized for purposes of collective bargaining.

Research

designed instruments were administered to two-hundred ninetyseven (297) non-union and two-hundred fifty-four (254) union,
randomly selected, elementary principals.

Chi-square and T-

tests of significance were applied to the data collected.
Collective bargaining did not insure greater job satisfaction,
improved

conditions

of

work

or

greater

control

of

the

principals job responsibilities.
In

a

Minnesota

study

comparing

bargaining

and

non-

bargaining principals, bargaining constituted a major vehicle
in the granting of rights to principals.

However, the absence

of these rights did not result in dissatisfaction with rights
(Morris,

1985).

In these investigations, controls such as

size of district and level of administration (secondary or
elementary) were considered and found to have no significant
impact on the findings (Nasstrom and Pier, 1983).
The Morris (1985) and Williams (1985) studies illustrate
the uncertainty surrounding an individual's perceptual versus
actual

differences

principal's

in

collective

existing
bargaining

working
represents

conditions.
a

alteration in the power structure of American education.

major
The

findings are inconsistent about whether perceptual differences
of working conditions exist between principals who bargain and
principals who

do not.

There is

principals' collective bargaining.

:Limited

information on

This study is a further

investigation into principals' perceptions of their working

40

conditions and the comparison of principals who are able to
participate in the collective bargaining process to those who
do not collectively bargain due to statutory limitations.
SUMMARY

In

this

chapter,

a

review

of

organizational

theory

introduced concepts and a historical overview of collective
bargaining was presented.
lack

of

certainty

bargaining

on

conditions.

The specific studies pointed to the

regarding

principals'
The

the

influence

perceptions

studies

also

of

suggest

a

of

collective

their
need

working
for

more

information in this area.
In Chapter III, the research methodology and procedures
selected

for

the

conduct

introduced and reviewed.
the

( 1)

research model,

procedures

specific

discussion

of

collection

procedures,

the

to

of

research

study will

be

This chapter includes a review of
(2 ) research methodology,
the

research

selected for the study.

the

and

study.

It

instrument,
the

data

also

and

includes

population,

analysis

(3 )
a

data

techniques

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
AND PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
This

chapter

presents

the

research

procedures selected to conduct the study.
includes a review of the
methodology,

and

(3)

(1)

methodology

The presentation

research model,

procedures

and

specific

(2)
to

research

the

study

including a discussion of the (a) population and study sample,
(b) data collection procedures (c) research instrument, and
(d) the data analysis activities selected for the study.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The design for this study is quanti tati ve in nature.
The research model was developed from the literature review
presented in Chapter II.

These scholarly contributions and

research studies, which cite collective bargaining's impact
upon

the

perceptions

of

principals

regarding

working

conditions, were used to design a framework for this research.
(See Figure 3).
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Perceptions of Principals Regarding Working Conditions In
Washington Who Can Collectively Bargain and Principals In
Oregon Who Can Not Collectively Bargain
surveY·With
QUestionnair~

February 1988
WAS

NGTON

Oregon
Principals
Can Not Collectively
Bargain ~

Washington
principals
Can Collectively
Bargain ~

Random Sample
of Principals

Random Sample of
principals

f

4
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

J

Perceptions
Compare
Perceptions
of Working --t. significant .41--- of Working
Conditions
Differences
Conditions

Categories
Salary
1.
Written Contracts
2.
Autonomy
3.
Power and Authority
4.
Job Security
5.
Fringe Benefits
G oup
6.
Role Definitions "4t--- and --~•• 7.
Communication
Individual
8.
Decision-making
Categories
9.
Figure 3.

Categories
Salary
Written Contracts
Autonomy
Power and Authority
Job Security
Fringe Benefits
Role Definitions
Communication
Decision making

Diagram of research study design.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research method used in gathering and analyzing the
data

was

descriptive

in

nature.

"describes and interprets what is.
conditions

or

relationships

that

Descriptive

research

It is concerned with
exist;

practices

that
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prevail; beliefs, points of view or attitudes that are held;
processes that are going on; or trends that are developing"
(Best, 1986, pg. 79).

This investigation utilizes a specific

subcategory of descriptive research known as the self-report
survey.
Survey research is a useful tool in education.

It is

ideally suited to and best adapted to the study of personal
and social facts, beliefs, and attitudes (Kerlinger, 1973).
Survey research has two basic advantages:

1) it has a wide

scope and can deal with a great deal of information from a
large

population

and

2)

is

accurate

(Kerlinger,

1973).

According to Babbie (1973), survey research is (1) logical and
facilitates logical understanding;
clarifies cause and affect,

(2) deterministic, as it

(3) general, because its purpose

is to understand a large population and the generalizability
of the findings to be tested and retested,

(4) parsimonious,

as a variety of explanatory models can be constructed and the
best

one

selected

for

use,

and

(5)

specific,

based

on

definitions and measurements (Babbie, 1973).
Best and Kahn

(1986)

note surveys as one of the most

commonly used research methods in the study of individuals.
This method gathers data from a relatively large number of
cases

at

a

particular

time.

The

survey

method

is

not

concerned with characteristics of individuals, but rather is
concerned with the generalized statistics which result when
data are abstracted from a number of individual cases.

The
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use of questionnaires mailed to school administrators has
proven successful in prior studies comparing bargaining and
non-bargaining principals.

Nasstrom and Pier (1983) compared

bargaining and non-bargaining principals in Minnesota both in
employment rights and personal satisfaction with employment.
Their study includes questionnaires mailed to principals to
determine their perceptions regarding the bargaining process.
Caldwell and Paul (1982) used a survey of three-hundred (300)
principals in Pennsylvania and their inclusion in formal or
informal

associations with school boards.

employed the survey technique to determine

Morris
if

(1985)

elementary

principals organized for purposes of collective bargaining
possessed a greater number of working conditions and enjoyed
greater

job

satisfaction

when

compared

to

principals not organized for these same purposes.

elementary
Williams

(1985) surveyed two-hundred (200) principals in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey to determine the relationship between the
existence of collective bargaining for school principals and
their perceptions of working conditions.
The present study is similar to Nasstrom and Pier's
William's

in

its

focus

bargaining principals.

on comparing bargaining

and

and
non-

However, the present study examines

only the principals' perceptions of their working conditions
in

two

states,

one

which

legislatively

permits

school

principals to collectively bargain and one which does not.
The determinants of principals' working conditions were
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identified and each of these were examined individually for
significant differences

betw~en

and non-bargaining principals.

the perceptions of bargaining
This design is diagrammed in

Figure 4.
PRIMARY
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Analysis of- - - _ •
Covariate
if n~~essary

COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Secondary

Control Variables

~ndependent

Type of District
District Size
Age
Sex

Non Bargaining
Principals
(Oregon)

Years in Administration
Bargaining
Principals
(Washington)

Years in Teaching
Level of Principal

. DEPENDEN~

"'-_____--.

~,

Salary

.,

~,

Existence
of
Formal
Contracts

Figure 4.

VARIABLE .~____

PERCEPTIONS OF
WORKING CONDITION

Autonomy

Job
security

Role
Definition

~,

Power
and
Authority

Variable
Degree of
Collective
Bargaining
1. Formal
2. Meet and
Confer
3. Unilateral
Decision
Making

I

~

,.,
Involvement
in Decision
Making
~r

~,Frin~e

Benefl.ts

Communication
wl.th
Board and
Superintendent

A schematic diagram of the research model.
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RESEARCH QUESTION

As stated previously, Washington school principals may
establish wages,

hours and other conditions of employment

through collective negotiations with their superintendents and
school boards.

Oregon laws do not sanction this arrangement.

The primary major research question addressed in this
study was:
Does

the existence of collective bargaining have

an

impact on public school principals' perceptions of their
determinant areas of working conditions?
HYPOTHESES

Simply stated the null hypothesis assumes there is no
significant
conditions

difference
by

bargaining

in

the

perceptions

principals

as

of

compared

working
to

non-

bargaining principals.
This analysis includes nine sub-hypotheses:
1.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining
principals regarding salary.
2.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non bargaining principals relative to
the existence of formal written contracts.
3.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to
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autonomy.
4.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining
principals relative to power and authority.
5.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of job security between bargaining and non-bargaining
principals relative to job security.
6.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

between bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative
to fringe benefits.
7.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

between bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative
to role definition.
S.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

between bargaining and non-bargaining principals in the
level

of

communication

with

school

boards

and

superintendents •
9.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

between bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative
to their involvement in decision making.
A second research question was additionally analyzed in
this study:
Does the level of collective bargaining have an effect
on the perceptions of principals with regard to the nine
areas of working conditions?
This second research hypothesis investigated the level
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of collective bargaining and the perceptions of the working
conditions of public school principals.

Nine additional sub-

hypotheses probed the secondary issue:
1.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of salary.
2.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of the existence of formal written contracts.
3.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of autonomy.
4.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of power and authority.
5.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of job security.
6.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of fringe benefits.
7.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of role definition.
8.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the
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perception of the level of communication with school
board and superintendent.
9.

There is no significant difference of the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of involvement in decision making.
CONTROL VARIABLES
A third research question was developed to control for
certain demographic variances in the sample population:
Is there a significant difference between bargaining non bargaining principals in each of the demographic
factors?
This analysis included seven sub-hypotheses:
1. There is no significant difference between bargaining
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to
type of school district.
2.

There is no significant difference between bargaining

and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to
district size.
3. There is no significant difference between bargaining
and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to
age.
4.

There is no significant difference between bargaining

and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to
their sex.
5.

There is no significance between bargaining and non-
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bargaining principals'

perceptions

relative

to

their

years in administration.
6.

There is no significant difference between bargaining

and non-bargaining principals' perceptions relative to
their years in teaching.
7.

There is no significance between bargaining and non-

bargaining principals'

perceptions

relative

to

their

level of principalship.
These control variables were analyzed with regard only
to the two states to compare the samples of the population for
any significant differences.
THE POPULATION AND STUDY SAMPLE
The population for this study consists of all elementary
and secondary public school principals in the states of Oregon
and Washington who serve in the role of building principal and
not

superintendent.

superintendent

Principals

who

also

in their districts were excluded

serve

as

from

the

population.
There are nine hundred eight (908) school principals in
the State of Oregon who serve solely as principal and one
thousand one hundred two (1102) in the State of Washington.
In populations this large, there is no need to obtain
information from all individuals.

A variation of the random

sample technique was selected for use in this study.

This

variation is called simple random sampling technique (Issac
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and William, 1983).

This variation allows drawing from a list

of potential respondents on an ordered basis.
Lists of all school principals in Oregon were obtained
from the Oregon state Department of Education and from the
Superintendents Office of Public Instruction in Washington.
These lists provided a complete and up to date list of school
principals in both states.
Before the lists could be used for respondent selection,
it was be necessary to identify any principal who also served
as the superintendent of a school district, due to the size
of the school district.

These individuals were excluded due

to a perceived lack of role definition in the area of labor
management relations.

This factor might influence responses

from superintendent/principals if selected.

The principals

on the lists were then numbered sequentially by state.
A group of one hundred (100) principals were selected
from the Oregon list (eleven percent) as respondents using a
table of random numbers and a group of one hundred (100) from
the Washington list (nine percent) using a table of random
numbers.
The use of a stratafied random sampling technique insured
the samples were representative of the total populations of
principals in the two states.

A sample size of ten percent

(!10%) constitutes the actual group for this investigation.
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SAMPLING PROCEDURE
In order to insure the sample was representative of all
school principals a

random sample procedure was used.

produce an unbiased sample,

a

To

list of all principals was

obtained from each state department of education and numbered
consecutively, excluding names of those who also served as
superintendents of the district.
numbers

chart

for

each

list,

using a computerized random
the

sample

of

one

hundred

principals from each state was selected.
This sample size represents approximately ten percent of
the total population available for study.

According to Ary

(1985), sample size depends upon the precision the researcher
desires in estimating the population parameter at a particular
confidence level (Ary et aI, 1985).
used to determine sample size.
two hundred

(200)

There is no single rule

This researcher determined

principals or ten percent of the total

population was of sufficient size to be representative of the
total study population.
PROCEDURES
In February, 1988 the questionnaire was mailed by u.S.
Mail to each of the two hundred selected principals in Oregon
and Washington.
Each questionnaire contained a cover letter summarizing
the

research

and

outlining the

effort

necessary

for

its
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completion (see Appendix A) and a letter of support from the
Director of the Association of washington School Principals.
Enclosed with the questionnaire was a postage paid return
envelope and a Baskin and Robbins Ice Cream Gift certificate
as a "reward" to each participating principal.

The ice cream

certificates were to increase the rate of return and reach the
goal

of

an

80%

return

rate.

Each

cover

letter

and

questionnaire included a code which allowed the researcher to
moni tor which respondants returned the survey.

The cover

letter, letter of support and questionnaire appear in the
appendix.

The questionnaire was designed to take fifteen

minutes to complete.

Respondents were requested to return the

questionnaire within two weeks after receipt.

After a follow-

up letter was sent which had limited response, a seventy four
(74) percent return rate was achieved for the study.
return rate for Oregon was sixty seven (67%)
eighty (80%) percent for Washington.

The

percent and

The original letter and

follow-up letter are contained in the Appendix A.
INSTRUMENTATION
The instrument selected for data gathering for the study
is the School Principals' Working Conditions Questionnaire.
This instrument, developed by the researcher, was developed
from a combination of the Middle Management Working Conditions
Questionnaire developed by Williams (1985), and The Principal
Attitude Questionnaire ... Non-Union and The Principal Attitude
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Questionnaire ... union by Morris

(1985). The questionnaires

from which the study instrument was developed have been used
in

similar

studies

measuring

the

perceptions

of

school

administrators regarding working conditions for the purpose
of

answering

bargaining..

questions

on

the

process

of

collective

Nine areas of concern to school principals as

noted by Williams (1985) are identified as the determinants
of principal's working conditions.

The areas to be measured:

salary, existence of formal written contracts, autonomy, power
and

authority,

job

security,

fringe

benefits,

role

definitions, communication and involvement in decision making
are included.
In Williams

(1985)

study

of

principals'

perceptions

regarding working conditions these determinants were used and
for any possible comparison to prior study results it would
be

beneficial

to

use

the

same

determinants.

The

two

instruments from the prior studies were found to be valid and
reliable measures

of principal's

perceptions

in

specific

studies conducted by the researchers related to collective
bargaining (Morris, 1985 and Williams, 1985).

In addition to

the information combined from the prior two investigations,
eight

questions

were

added

to

the

proposed

study's

instrumentation to even the balance of questions

in each

determinant area.
Thirty-two
dependent

questions

variables

of

collected data
the

research

specific

design

on

to

the

working
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conditions.

Nine dependent variable subsets were identified:

1)

2)

salary,

existence of

formal

wri tten

contracts,

3)

autonomy, 4) power and authority, 5) job security, 6) fringe
benefits,

7)

role

definitions,

8)

communication

and

9)

involvement in decision making to collect SUbcategory data
relative to the perceptions of the respondent principals.
Each of the thirty-two (32) items made a statement about the
management

of

Respondents

schools.

were

instructed

to

indicate the extent to which the stated condition actually
exists in their school district based on a Likert-type scale.
The scale ranged from a high of 5 to a low of 1 -

(Not at all).

(To a very large extent)

There were three to five items

devoted to each of the nine areas designated as of primary
concern to school principals (Williams, 1985).

(See Figure

5) •

Anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed.

special

instructions were provided to those who desire to receive a
copy of the results; a stamped, self addressed envelope was
included for the instrument's return and a Baskin Robbins ice
cream certificate as a "Thank You" for their completion and
participation in the study.
Due to the

lack of

specific measures

listed

in the

research for previous instruments this instrument was checked
for reliability through a test - retest model and a split half reliability check.
The

test-retest

reliability

tests

consistency

of

a
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subject score over time

(Ary et aI, 1985).

In the test -

retest procedure, the instrument was administered to twenty
(20) principals, twice, with a two week time interval between
each administration.

The reliability for the instrument using

Pearson's R correlation was .96 reliability in the test retest procedure.
Reliability
of Question
Set
(Test-Retest)

Determinant Area

Question Numbers

1- Salary

*12, *13, *23
*16, *18,**22

.92
.97

*29, *30, **31
*19, *20, **21,
**28
*11, *17, **32
*4, *14, *15,
**27
*10, *22, *24
*1, *2, *3, **25,
**26
*5, *6, *7, *8,
*9

.95
.91

2. Existence of Formal
Contracts
3. Autonomy
4. Power and Authority
5. Job Security
6. Fringe Benefits
7. Role Definition
8. Communication
9. Involvement in
Decision Making

*

other research

Figure 5.

.100
.97
.89
.96
.99

** researcher constructed

Nine determinant area question distribution.

The split - half technique is one of the most popular
reliability checks (Ary, 1985).

The split - half reliability

for the instrument was .96 using Pearson's Rand .99 using the
Spearman - Brown Prophecy formula to compensate for the fact
that reliability was estimated from a test one-half the length
of the final form.
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Content validity cannot be expressed in numerical terms.
It is the validation of the content based essentially, and out
of necessity,

on judgement.

It invol ves the careful and

critical examination of the test items as they relate to the
specified content area (Ary, et al 1985).
Validity of the instrument was checked in two ways.

A

ten member panel of principals who were not in the respondent
group was selected to review and critique the instrumentation
format

and

questionnaire

content

reliability.

These

principals were known to the researcher, and it was believed
they

would

be

questionnaire
instrument,

objective

instrument.

and

candid

All

ten

in

review

members

with one member indicating need

clarification.

This

clarification,

in

the

of

the

reviewed

the

for

specific

demographic

information, was regarding his district's classification as
"urban, rural or suburban".

As a result the classification

of "small town" was added.
The second check for validity was a review and critique
by academic faculty at Portland state University.
faculty members assisting with the final
instrument

were

Dr.

Joel

Arick,

an

Those

revision of the

educational

research

specialist,

Dr. Kathleen Westbrook, Assistant Professor of

Education,

Dr.

John

F.

Heflin,

Associate

Professor

of

Education, Dr. Jack Lind, Professor of Education and Dr. Nancy
Koroloff, Professor of Social Work.
provided

by

Tom

Moreno,

a

Additional assistance was

statistician

and

research
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methodologist.
The

research

instrument

was

designed

and

developed

between March 1987 and February 1988, under the direction of
Dr.

John

F.

Heflin,

Chairperson

of

the

investigator's

Dissertation Committee and Dr. Joel Arick, a member of the
investigator's Dissertation Committee.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
This study employs a descriptive design using survey
techniques to describe two groups of principals and compare
their perceptions of working conditions.

The determinants of

principals' working conditions as identified,

are examined

individually to discover the existance of any significant
difference

in

the

perceptions

of working

conditions

for

bargaining and non-bargaining principals.
After all the data was collected and organized, it was
analyzed using descriptive statistics to uncover differences
between the two comparison groups.

The nine determinants of

principals' working conditions: salary, existence of formal
written

contracts,

autonomy,

power

and

authority,

job

security, fringe benefits, role definitions, communication and
involvement in decision making were examined.
Primary Independent Variable Data Analysis
Responses to the questions were compared for the two
principal groups.

The analysis of the data is presented in
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tabular format and compares principals'

perceptions in the

nine areas of primary concern to principals (see pages 50 and
51).

The items pertaining to each of the nine determinant
areas of working conditions were grouped together, totaled and
averages computed.

For example, items 4# 12, 13, and 23, which

pertain to salary, were grouped together.

A one-way analysis

of variance was used to compare the perceptions of bargaining
and non-bargaining principals for each of the nine determinant
areas to determine significant differences.

These data were

no longer treated as ordinal but were collapsed to simulate
interval data and a one-way analysis of variance procedure
applied for each of the respective groups.
Secondary Independent Variable Analysis
Respondents'
representing

answers

levels

of

were

collective

formalized collective bargaining,
decisions.

grouped

into

bargaining

informal,

catagories
including

and unilateral

A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare

responses to these questions by principals and allow analysis
of the secondary research questions noted on pages 52 and 53.
Covariance
Any

demographic

factors

found

to

vary

significantly

between bargaining and non-bargaining principal groups (see
demographic factor section), were used as covariates and an
analysis of covariance procedure was conducted.

Analysis of
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covariance

helps

independent

to

explain· the

variable

effect

of

the

(bargaining/non-bargaining)

primary
while

controlling the effect of the identified demographic factors.
Data

were

respondents

reported

with

respect

to

any

variation

in terms of demographic information.

As

in
an

example, variation in either level of the principalship or
size of school district were reported.
analyzed

using

a

Chi

(

)

technique

These data were
to

determine

significant differences between demographic variables

if
and

Oregon and Washington principals' perceptions were present.
This

analysis

includes

seven

additional

sub-hypotheses

enumerated on pages 53 and 54 of this study.
SUMMARY

Chapter

III

presents

the

research

procedures used in the conduct of this study.
includes a review of the
methodology,

and

(3)

(1)

methodology

and

The information

research model,

(2)

research

procedures specific to the study.

A

discussion of the population and study sample, data collection
procedures, research instrumentation, and the data analysis
techniques were enumerated.
Chapter IV discusses the results of the data analysis
activities.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Chapter IV is divided into five sections.
section

includes

the

primary

determinants of working conditions.
a

analysis

for

The first
the

nine

The second section covers

secondary analysis of the data based on the level of

collective bargaining and perceptions of working conditions
as identified by the nine sub-hypothesis questions.

section

three reports the demographic analysis findings which includes
seven sub-hypotheses.
analysis

of

section four presents data from the

covariance

and

section

five

summarizes

the

chapter.
PRIMARY ANALYSIS
Test of the Primary Hypothesis
The primary hypothesis was constructed to determine if
the existence of collective bargaining has an impact on public
school principals' perceptions of their working conditions.
The primary hypothesis was stated as follows:
There is no significant difference in the perceptions of
working conditions in bargaining principals as compared
to non-bargaining principals.
This hypothesis was tested through the application of a
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one-way analysis of variance procedure on the

calc'U.~.ated

group

means of the two sample groups on nine sub-hypotheses:
1.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining
principals regarding salary.
2.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding the
existence of formal written contracts.
3.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding
autonomy.
4.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining
principals regarding power and authority.
5.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non bargaining principals regarding job
security.
6.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding
fringe benefits.
7.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals regarding
role definition.
8.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals in the level
of

communications

with

school

board

members

and
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superintendents.
9.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non bargaining principals in their
involvement in decision making.
The data

for these nine research

sub-hypotheses

are

reported here (see Table I).
The data reported in Table I shows only two of the nine
primary sub-hypotheses,

the areas of Formal Contracts and

Autonomy, were found to be statistically significant.

The

remaining null hypotheses were not found to be statistically
significant at p=<.05 level and failed to be rejected.
The Existence of Formal written Contracts
One of the primary concerns of principals, in determining
perceptions of working conditions, is the existence of formal
written administrative contracts (Barea, 1978).

Principals

in both Oregon and Washington were polled to determine the
extent of written contracts.
Figure

6

shows

the

distribution

of

responses

of

principals who may bargain (Washington) and those who may not
(Oregon) .

This figure shows Washington principals have a

higher mean score than Oregon principals with regard to the
existence of formal contracts.
highlights
contracts

bargaining
exist to

The shape of the distribution

principals

perceive

a greater degree than

formal

written

do non-bargaining
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TABLE I
LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE ON THE NINE SUB-HYPOTHESES QUESTIONS
REGARDING BARGAINING AND NON-BARGAINING
PRINCIPALS AND THEIR PERCEPTIONS
OF WORKING CONDITIONS.

Working

F-

Significance

Conditions

Ratio

Means

Level
p < .05

DF

WA/OR

1. Salary

0.027

NS

1, 142

2. Formal Contract

6.122

.015

1, 140

3.38/3.13

3. Autonomy

7.934

.006

1, 140

2.90/3.24

4. Power/Authority

0.368

NS

1, 130

5. Job Security

0.170

NS

1, 128

6. Fringe Benefits

0.181

NS

1, 142

7. Role Definition

0.095

NS

1, 140

8. Communication

0.162

NS

1, 133

9. Decision Making

1.977

NS

1, 139

NS
WA
OR

= Not Significant
= Washington (Bargaining)
= Oregon (Non-bargaining)

See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance
statistics.
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WASHINGTON

(M=3.38)

OREGON

(M=3.13)
1.00

2.00

3.00

~.oo

Figure 6. Histogram of principals perceptions
regarding the existence of formal written contracts.
principals, whose responses were clustered at the low end of
the scale.
A one-way analysis of variance of these responses was
found to be statistically significantly different at .015 (See
Table I).
The null form for this sub-hypothesis stated there is no
significant difference in the perceptions of bargaining and
non bargaining principals regarding the existence of formal
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written contracts.

A test of statistical significance at the

.05 level was performed and the null hypothesis was rejected
(see Figure 6).
Autonomy
Another condition which was identified as having impact
upon principals' perceptiond of working conditions was the
degree of administrative autonomy.

Independence

and the

discretion to manage a building were considered crucial if
principals are to fulfill leadership roles.
Principals

from

both

bargaining

and

non-bargaining

samples were questioned about the degree of autonomy they felt
they possessed.
of

the

Figure 7 presents the frequency distributions

principals'

responses.

The

figure

shows

Oregon

principals (non-bargaining) report a higher mean score than
Washington principals (bargaining) with regard to autonomy.
The shape of the distribution shows non-bargaining principals
perceive

they

principals.

have

greater

Non-bargaining

autonomy

than

principals'

do

bargaining

responses

were

clustered at the higher end of the scale, while bargaining
principals' responses spread along the continuum.
An analysis of variance procedure determining differences
between

the

significant.

two

groups

was

found

to

be

statistically

The differences were found to be statistically

significant at the .05 level (see Table I).
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WASHINGTON

----

(M=2.90)

-- - -- - - - -- - -- - ----

OREGON

(M=3.24)
1.00

4.00

3.00

2.00

Figure 7. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding autonomy.
The null form for this sub-hypothesis states there is no
significant difference

in the perceptions

bargaining and non-bargaining principals.

of autonomy

of

Based upon the

selected .05 level of significance, the null hypothesis was
rejected.

It

appears

Oregon

(non-bargaining)

principals

perceive the existence of autonomy more positively than do
Washington (bargaining) principals.
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SECONDARY ANALYSIS
The secondary question was to analyze for effect of three
perceived
principals'
conditions.

levels

of

collective

perceptions
The

responded were:

of

bargaining

the

nine

relative

areas

of

to

working

levels of bargaining to which principals
1) Formal collective bargaining, 2) Informal

collective bargaining and 3) Unilateral decision making(see
Table II).

One hundred questionnaires were sent to principals

in Oregon,

and sixty-seven (67)

were returned.

Of these,

eight (8) or twelve (12%) percent were from principals who did
not meet at all with representatives of top management to
The school board and

determine their working conditions.

superintendent made these decisions and informed principals
who accept these unilateral decisions.
TABLE II
LEVELS OF BARGAINING INDICATED BY PRINCIPALS' RESPONSES.
Formal
Barg.

Informal
Barg.

Unilateral
Decision

Non
Response

Num/Per

Nwn/Per

Num/Per

Num/Per

Oregon

17/27%

38/60%

8/12%

33/33%

Washington

22/30%

39/53%

12/16%

20/20%

Total

39/29%

77/59%

20/14%

Num = Number
Per = Percent
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Thirty-eight (38) principals reported they held informal
collective bargai.ning meetings with the superintendent and/or
representatives of the school board.

This number represents

sixty (60%) percent of Oregon's respondents.
Seventeen (17) Oregon principals or twenty-seven (27%)
percent indicated that there was formal collective bargaining
between representatives of middle management and the school
board.
Washington principals' responses were not substantively
different from the Oregon sample relative to the degree of
administrative collective bargaining (see Table II).
finding was unanticipated by the researcher.

This

Inspection of

the data indicated only three (3%) percent more Washington
principals when compared to Oregon principals were involved
in collective negotiations even though the statutory authority
for bargaining exists in Washington State.
Of the eighty (80) questionnaires returned, twenty-two
(22), or thirty (30%) percent of the Washington respondents
stated they were involved in formal collective bargaining with
their school boards.

Thirty-nine (39), or fifty-three (53%)

percent were engaged in informal collective bargaining.
were twelve

(12)

principals or sixteen

(16%)

There

percent who

reported they did not meet and accepted unilateral decisions
by top management concerning working conditions.
In combining data from both states, thirty-nine (39) or
twenty-nine (29%) percent of the principals perceived they
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are involved in formal collective bargaining, seventy-seven
(77) or fifty-nine (59%) percent, in informal bargaining and
twenty (20) or fourteen (14%) percent in unilateral decision
processes (See Table II).
Nine sub-hypotheses were tested using a one-way analysis
of variance procedure to compare responses reported by the
principals:
1.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of salary.
2.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of the existence of formal written contracts.
3.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of autonomy.
4.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of power and authority.
5.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of job security.
6.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

perception of fringe benefits.

relative

to

the
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7.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of role definition.
8.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of the level of communication with the school
board and superintendent.
9.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of involvement in decision making.
Graphic

data

to

test

these

nine

sub-hypotheses

are

reported in Table III.
Salary
The

first

variable

perceptions was salary.

having

an

effect

on

principals'

A comparison of the three levels of

collective bargaining (formal collective bargaining, informal
bargaining, and unilateral decision making) with salary was
conducted using a one-way analysis of variance procedure.
The significance level in the group means was at the .00
level.

Figure 8 portrays the frequency of responses for three

groups of principals:

1) principals who formally bargain, 2)

principals who informally bargain and 3) principals who accept
unilateral decisions with regard to salary.

The shape of the

distribution indicates principals who formally bargain report
a higher degree of satisfaction
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TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE NINE HYPOTHESES REGARDING
LEVEL OF BARGAINING AND PRINCIPALS PERCEPTIONS
OF WORKING CONDITIONS.
Working
Conditions

FRatio

1. Salary

10.969

.00

2. Formal
Contract

0.052

NS

2, 129

3. Autonomy

2.301

NS

2, 128

4. Power/
Authority

3.927

.022

2.55/2.76/2.29

2, 120

5. Job Security

4.509

.013

3.05/3.19/2.65

2, 120

6. Fringe
Benefits

4.238

.016

3.06/3.18/2.33

2, 131

7. Role
Definition

3.612

.03

3.33/3.26/2.81

2, 129

8. Communicate

0.336

NS

9. Decision
Making

6.046

.00

p=<.05

Means:
FB/IB/UD
3.10/3.01/2.23

DF
2, 130

2, 125
2.90/3.22/2.77

NS = Not Significant
FB = Formal Bargaining
IB = Informal Bargaining
UD = Unilateral Decisions

See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance
statistics.

2, 129
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FORMAL

(K=3.10)

INFORMAL

(K=3.01)

UNILATERAL

(K=2.23)
1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

Figure 8. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding salary and level of collective bargaining.
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wi th

their

level

of

those

salary
who

than

were

do

principals

recipients

of

who

meet

informally

or

unilateral

decisions.

These responses are grouped at the higher end of

the scale while the remaining groups spread more evenly over
the entire continuum.
The null form of this sub-hypothesis states there is no
significant difference between the three levels of bargaining
relative to principals' perception of salary.
level of .05 level was selected.

A significance

The null sub-hypothesis was

rejected as the difference of the groups means was significant
at the .00 level (see Table III).

It appears principals who

formally bargain have a higher degree of satisfaction with
their salary level than reported by the other two sample
groups.
Power and Authority
In comparing the levels of bargaining and principals'
perceptions regarding power and authority, a one-way analysis
of variance was performed.
Figure 9 depicts the frequency distribution of responses
between the variable of power and authority as reported by
the three sample groups.

The distribution indicates the

informal bargaining group had a higher mean score than the
other two sample groups.

These responses were clustered at

two points at a higher level as compared to the other two
sample groups which clustered at one point or are more
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l

FORMAL

(M=2.55)
INFORMAL

(M=2.76)
UNILATERAL

(M=2.29)
1. 00

2.00

3.00

Figure 9. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding power and authority with collective
bargaining level.

4.00
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dispersed across the continuum points.
The null form of this sub-hypothesis states there is no
significant difference in the level of collective bargaining
relative to the perception of power and authori ty .
comparing

the

group

means,

a

significant

When

statistical

difference at the .02 level was found and is reported in Table
III.

Based on a .05 rejection level, the null hypothesis was

rejected and the research hypothesis retained.

It appears

principals who formally bargain perceive power and authority
at higher levels than do the remaining two sample principal
groups.
Job Security
Job security is another key factor related. to working
conditions.
responses.

Figure 10 shows the frequency distribution of
Principals reported regarding their perceptions

of job security and level of bargaining.

The distribution

shows the informal group responses clustered at the high end
of the scale thereby producing a higher mean score than the
remaining two principal groups.

Principal responses belonging

to the formal bargaining and unilateral decision groups were
dispersed more broadly across the continuum.
An analysis of variance compared the means for these
groups

to

assess

significant

differences.

Tests

of

significance difference were calculated at the .01 level as
noted in Table III.
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FORMAL

(M=3.05)

INFORMAL

(H=3.19)
UNILATERAL

(M=2.65)

1.00

2.00

3.00

Figure 10. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding job security with collective bargaining
level.

4.00
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The null form of this sub-hypothesis states there is no
significant difference of the three

levels

of bargaining

relative to principals' perceptions of job security.

Based

on a statistical test at the .05 level of rejection, the null
hypothesis was rejected.

The data indicate principals who

informally meet perceive themselves to have a higher level of
job security than do principals who bargain formally or are
participants in unilateral decision making (See Table III).
Fringe Benefits
Fringe

benefits

are

another

principals' working conditions.
bargaining

wi th

principals'

important

aspect

of

A comparison of the level of
perceptions

of

their

fringe

benefits was calculated using a one-way analysis of variance.
The

means

and

distribution

of

responses

for

bargaining level group are compared in Figure 11.

The

each

distribution of responses by principals in the three levels
shows the informal group has a higher mean score than the
other two principal groups.

These responses were clustered

at the high end of the continuum while the remaining two
groups (formal and unilateral decision making responses) were
more evenly distributed across the continuum.
The

difference,

as

noted

in

Table

III,

shows

a

statistically significant difference at the .016 level, using
a one-way analysis of variance.
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FORM..AL

(M=3.06)
INFORMAL

---- -- - - -- - - ---

- - - - -(M=3.18)
-- --- -- - --

UNILATERAL

(M=2.33)
1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

Figure 11. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding fringe benefits with collective bargaining
level.
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The null form for this sub-hypothesis states there is no
significant difference amoung the three levels of bargaining
in regards to principals I
Based on a
rejected.

perceptions of fringe benefits.

.05 level of rejection, the null hypothesis was
There

appeares

to

be

a

significant

difference

between those principals who informally bargain and those who
formally bargain or participate in unilateral decision making.
Principals who informally bargain perceive that they have a
higher level of fringe benefits.
Role Definition
Role definition is defined by the elements within a job
description

and

the

related

staff

development

programs

designed specifically for administrators.
Figure

12

shows

the

frequency

of

responses

of

respondent principals with regard to role definition.

all
The

distribution of responses cluster at the high end of the
continuum for the formal bargaining group, reporting a higher
mean score than the other two sample groups.

The informal

group, although also clustered near the high end of the scale,
had lower overall responses and a more evenly distributed
response set across the lower end of the continuum than was
the

case

for

the

formal

group.

The

responses

for

the

unilateral group were spread evenly across the continuum.
The null form for this sub-hypothesis stated that there
is no significant difference between the level of collective
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FORMAL

INFORHAL

(M=3.26)

UNILATERAL

(M=2.81)

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

Figure 12. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding role definition with collective bargaining
level.
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bargaining and perceptions of role definition.

A statistical

test at the .05 level of significance led to a rejection of
the null hypothesis.

The difference in the means of the

groups was significant at the

.03

level

(See Table III).

There is a significant difference in the perceptions of role
definition for principals who formally bargain when compared
to those who informally meet or those who accept unilateral
decisions.
Involvement In Decision Making
The degree of involvement in decision making was the last
factor

to

be

compared.

A

comparison

of

the

level

of

bargaining with principals I perceptions of their participation
in decision making was conducted using an analysis of variance
technique.
Figure
respondent

13

shows

principals

the
who

frequency
formally

distribution
bargain

of

and

the

their

perceptions of involvement in decision making as well as the
responses of those principals who informally bargain and those
who accept unilateral decisions.

The distribution responses

in the three bargaining levels shows the informal group IS
responses cluster toward the high end of the continuum.

The

mean score for this group was higher than for the remaining
two groups whose responses were distributed more evenly across
the continuum.
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FORMAL

(M=2.90)

INFORKAL

(M=3.22)
UNILATERAL

(M=2.77)
1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

Figure 13. Histogram of principals' perceptions
regarding decision making with collective bargaining
level.
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The null form for this sub-hypothesis states there is no
significant difference in the level of bargaining in regards
to the perception of

involvement

in decision making.

A

statistical test at the .05 level led to the rejection of the
null hypothesis

(the difference was significant at the .00

level (see Table III)}.
informal

level

of

For those principals engaging in an

collective

bargaining,

there

was

a

significantly higher mean score than for the other groups.
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA ANALYSIS
The third section of the data analysis activities was
constructed to analyze demographic data and
effect on principals' perceptions of

'~orking

demographic

were:

variable

included

its

possible

conditions.
1)

The

district

classification, 2) district size, 3} age, 4} gender,S) years
in aruninistration, 6) years in teaching, and 7) current level
of position.
One

of

These data are reported in Table IV.
the

hypotheses

tested

in

this

study

was

to

determine if a significant difference exists between the two
groups of principals, bargaining and non-bargaining, with each
of the identified demographic variables.
This analysis included seven sub-hypotheses:
1.

There is no significance between bargaining and non-

bargaining principals and the type of school district.
2.

There is no significance between bargaining and non-

bargaining principals and their district size.
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TABLE IV
DESCRIPTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR THE STUDY.

WA

OR

Study

Dist. Classification
%
%
%
%

Rural
Small Town
Suburban
Urban

21.25
22.50
40.00
16.25

32.84
37.31
13.43
16.42

26.53
29.25
27.89
16.33

45.47
36.71
17.72

23.88
47.76
28.36

23.88
47.76
28.36

33-61
46

31-66
45

31-66
45.6

81.25
18.75

77.61
22.39

79.59
20.14

1-31
12.2

2-41
10

1-41
12

3-21
9.3

1-27
10.4

1-27
9.7

31.25
23.75
45.00

17.91
19.40
62.69

Dist. Size
% Large
% Medium
% Small

Age
Range
Mean
Gender
% Male

% Female
Yrs. In Administration
Range
Mean
Yrs. In Teaching
Range
Mean
Current Level Of
Position
% Secondary
% Middle
% Elementary

%

=

Percent

25.17
21. 77
53.06
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3.

There is no significance between bargaining and

non-bargaining principals and their age.
4.

There is no significance between bargaining and

non-bargaining principals and their gender.
5.

There is no significance between bargaining and

non-bargaining principals and their years in
administration.
6.

There is no significance between bargaining and

non-bargaining principals and their years in teaching.
7.

There is no significance between bargaining and non-

bargaining principals and their level of principalship.
The results of the data analysis activities using a Chi
Square (~~) analysis are reported in Table V.
demogra"phic

variables

were

analyzed

Seven major

looking

for

major

differences between bargaining (Washington) and non-bargaining
(Oregon) principal groups.

Two were found to be statistically

significant with this analysis:
district size.

district classification and

The other five demographic variables may be

related within groups with regard to working conditions but
for

the

analysis,

the

demographic

variables

were

only

considered for group the bargaining and non-bargaining bias.
District Classification
Principals

responded

to

the

district

classification

section of the study by classifying their district.
of district classifications were:

The types

1) urban, 2) suburban, 3)
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TABLE V
LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A CHI-SQUARE
ANALYSIS OF BARGAINING AND NON-BARGAINING
PRINCIPAL AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR.
Demographic
Factor

x2
Value

1- District Class.

2. District Size

Level of
significance
p=<.05

13.808

.003

2, 144

7.663

.022

2, 144

3. Age

NS

4. Gender

NS

6. Years in Teaching

NS

7. Level of Position

=

1, 145

NS

.297

5. Years in Admin.

NS

OF

2, 144

NS

4.122

Not -S-ig·nificant

See Appendix C for additional analysis statistics.
small town or 4) rural (See Table VI).

The significance of

this variable appears attributable to a key finding that the
number of principals responding from suburban districts was
considerably higher from Washington than from Oregon.
District

classification

was

compared

with

working

condition determinants found to be significant in the primary
and secondary data analyses.
An analysis of variance was conducted to determine what
effect district classification had on bargaining and non-
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TABLE VI
CHI SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPARING BARGAINING
AND NON-BARGAINING PRINCIPALS WITH THE DEMOGRAPHIC
VARIABLE OF DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION.

urban

TOTAL

6.12

7.48

45.58

12.24

21. 77

8.84

54.42

29.25

27.89

16.33

100.00

rural

small town

Oregon

14.97

17.01

Washington

11.56

TOTAL

26.53

suburl;>an

Test Statistic

Value

Pearson Chi-Square

13.808

DF

Prob

2

.003

bargaining principals in the two significant areas of working
conditions:
analysis

Autonomy and Formal Contracts (see Table I).

revealed a

significant effect

for

this

The

control

variable on the dependent variable with regard to autonomy at
the .03 level.

The analysis of variance also identified a

significant effect for this control variable on the dependent
variable of formal contracts at the. 01 level (see Table VII) •
The data suggests the factor of suburban district (which is
not as closely matched as the other classifications between
the two states) has a significant effect on determinants of
autonomy and formal contracts.

There were more respondents

from suburban districts in Washington than from Oregon.
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TABLE VII
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF
VARIANCE OF DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION AND WORKING
CONDITIONS FOUND SIGNIFICANT.

Primary Analysis
Working Condition

F
Ratio

significant
Level
p=<.05

OF

Autonomy

3.152

.027

3, 138

Formal Contracts

3.483

.011

3, 138

8.246

.000

3, 140

Secondary Analysis
Working Condition
Salary
Power/Authority

NS

Job Security

NS

Fringe Benefits

NS

Role Definition

10.778

Decision Making

3.136

.00

3, 138

.028

3, 137

NS = Not significant
See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance
statistics.
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An analysis of variance was also conducted to determine
the

effect

bargaining

of
for

district

classification

on

each of the six working

the

levels

conditions

significant with regard to level of bargaining:

of

found

1) salary,

2) role definitions, 3) power and authority, 4) involvement
in decision making, and 5) fringe benefits.
As noted in Table VII, the analysis of variance revealed
a significant effect by this control variable in the area of
salary at the .00 level, the area of role definition at the
.00 level and the area of decision making at the .03 level
based on a significant level of .05.

It appears there is a

significant effect on those three working conditions based
upon district classification.
District Size
The questionnaire asked respondents to categorize the
size

of

the

districts

they represented.

Districts were

divided into three categories:
1) Small
2) Medium
3) Large

o - 999 students
1000 - 4999 students
5000 - larger students

This demographic variable was found to be significant at
the

.05

level

(See

Table

VIII).

The

significance

is

attributed to the numbers of principals responding in the
large

district

respondents
Oregon.

from

category.

There

large districts

were

considerably

more

in Washington than

from
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TABLE VIII
CHI SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE COMPARING BARGAINING AND
NON-BARGAINING PRINCIPALS WITH DISTRICT SIZE.

PERCENTS OF TOTAL
LARGE

MEDIUM

SMALL

TOTAL

OREGON

10.96

21.92

13.01

45.89

WASHINGTON

24.66

19.86

9.59

54.11

TOTAL

35.62

41. 78

22.60

100.00

TEST STATISTIC

VALUE

DF

PROB

PEARSON CHI-SQUARE

7.663

2

.022

Analysis of variance was conducted to
effect

of

demographic

independent
principals.

variable

variable
of

of

determine the

district

bargaining

and

size

on

the

non-bargaining

The only dependent variable of working conditions

found to be significant was formal contracts.

The analysis

of variance found the effect to be significant at the .03
level, based on a significance level of .05 (See Table IX).
The number of principals responding from large districts in
washington, when compared with the number of principals in
Oregon,

has

contracts.

a

significant effect on

the

area

of

formal
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TABLE IX
LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE AS DETERMINED BY A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS
OF VARIANCE OF DISTRICT SIZE AND WORKING CONDITIONS
FOUND SIGNIFICANT.

Primary Analysis
Working Condition

FRatio

DF

Autonomy
Formal Contracts

Level of
Significance
p=<.05
NS

3.786

2, 138

.025

10.642

2, 140

.00

2.959

2, 129

.055

Secondary Analysis
Work Condition
Salary
Power/Authority
Job Security

NS

Fringe Benefits

NS

Role Definition
Decision Making

12.504

2, 138

.00
NS

NS = Not Significant
See Appendix C for additional analysis of variance
statistics.
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An analysis of variance was also conducted to examine
the effect of district size on the levels of bargaining and
working conditions which were statistically significant in
the Secondary Analysis Section.

These were salary,

role

definition, power and authority, and involvement in decision
making.
As noted in Table IX, this analysis showed district size
to

have

a

significant

effect

upon

salary

(.OO),

role

definition (.OO), and power and authority (.05 level).
Analysis of Covariance
Since

district

significantly

vary

principal groups

classification
between

and

~argaining

size
and

of

district

non-bargaining

(see Demographic Data Analysis

section),

these variables were used as covariates in an ANCOVA analysis
of the six significant determinants of working conditions.
Three of the six analyses were

found to be statistically

significant (see Table X).
The analysis

of covariance

determined the

effect

of

district classification and district size upon the independent
variable of bargaining and non-bargaining principals and its
impact on the dependent variable of autonomy.

After adjusting

for the two covariates, the significant difference was at the
.01 level.

A statistical test at the .05 level of rejection

was conducted.

The primary analysis sub-hypothesis that there

is no significant difference in bargaining and non-bargaining
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TABLE X
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE OF DISTRICT SIZE AND DISTRICT
CLASSIFICATION ~ND THE SIX SIGNIFICANT
DETERMINANTS OF WORKING CONDITIONS.

Analysis

working
Condition

DF

F -

Mean

Ratio

signif.
p=<.05

Primary Bargaining/
Non Bargain.

WA/OR

Primary

Auto.

Primary

Formal Cont.

1, 137

6.478

2.90/
3.24

.01

3.332

3.38/
3.13

NS

Secondary FB/
IB/
UD

Level of
Bargaining
Secondary

Salary

Secondary

2, 127

7.848

3.10/
3.01/
2.23

.001.

Power/Author.

2.922

2.55/
2.76/
2.29

NS

Secondary

Role Def.

1.177

3.33/
3.26/
2.81

NS

Secondary

Decision
Making

6.156

2.90/
3.22/
2.77

.03

2, 128

FB = Formal Bargaining
IB = Informal Bargaining
UD = unilateral Decision Making
See Appendix C for additional analysis statistics.
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principals with

regard to

autonomy was

rejected.

There

appears to be a significant difference between bargaining and
non-bargaining principals with reference to their perception
of autonomy (see Figure 7).
For

a

secondary

level

of

analysis

(the

bargaining), two determinants were significant.

level

of

The first

measured the effect of district classification and district
size on the independent variable level of bargaining and its
impact on the dependent variable of salary.

Adjusting for

the two covariates, a .00 level of significance was calculated
(See

Table

X).

The

sub-hypothesis

that

there

is

no

significant difference in the level of bargaining with regard
to salary was rejected based upon a test at the .05 level of
significance.
The second analysis of covariance measured the effect of
the

covariates

upon the

level

involvement in decision making.

of

bargaining

relative

to

After adjusting for the two

covariates, the level of significance was adjusted to .00 (See
Table X).
a

The secondary sub-hypothesis was rejected based on

.05 rejection level.

The hypothesis states there is no

significant difference in the level of bargaining with regard
to involvement in decision making.
Even after adjusting for other significant factors, both
salary and involvement in decision making appear significant.
An analysis of covariance was not used to analyze the
data regarding fringe benefits and job security as they had
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already been determined to be significant through the analysis
of variance.

The demographic data was not found to have any

significant effect on their significance and therefore,
analysis of covariance was not necessary.

an

The data analysis

identified differences in the perceptions of principals who
participate

in

formal

bargainin9,

principals

invol ved

in

informal bargaining and those who accept unilateral decisions.
Principals involved in formal bargaining report significantly
higher mean responses in the area of salary than those who
informally

bargain

or

who

decisions (see Figure 8).
report

significantly

involvement

in

are

of

unilateral

Principals who informally bargain

higher

decision

recipients

mean

making,

scores

fringe

relative

benefits

to

and

job

security than those who participate in formal bargaining or
unilateral decision making models.
SUMMARY

This chapter presented an analysis of the data for this
investigation.

The activities included 1) analysis of the

nine areas of working conditions, 2) analysis of the level of
bargaining

and

perceptions

of

working

conditions,

demographic analysis with seven sub hypotheses,

3)

and 4)

an

analysis of covariance (see Table XI).
The

primary

analysis

compared

bargaining

and

non-

bargaining principals using nine determinant areas of working
conditions in which two areas were found to be significant:

r---
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TABLE XI
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DETERMINANTS OF WORKING
CONDITIONS IN EACH ANALYSIS.

Primary

Analysis

Formal

0.015

7.934

0.006

10.969

0.000

3.927

0.022

4.509

0.013

Benefits

4.238

0.016

Definition

3.612

0.030

6.046

0.003

3.152

0.027

3.483/
3.786

0.025/
0.011

8.246

0.000

10.778

0.000

2.959

0.055

3.136

_028

Autonomy

6.478

0.012

Salary

7.848

0.001

6.156

0.030

4.238
4.509

0.016
0.013

Secondary

Salary

of

Bargaining

Power/Authority
Job

Security

Fringe
Role

Decision

Demographic
Analysis
of District
Size andl
or Classification
ANOVA

Making

Autonomy
Contracts

Formal

Salary
Role

Definition

Power/Authority
Decision

Primary
ANCOVA

Analysis

Secondary
ANCOVA

Analysis

Decision
ANCOVA

NOT

NEEDED

Significance
p=<_05

6.122

Autonomy

Analysis

Ratio

Contracts

Bargain/Non-bargain
ANOVA

Level
ANOVA

F-

Working
Condition

Analysis

Making

Making

Benefits
Fringe
Job Security
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1) formal contracts and 2) autonomy.

The secondary analysis

compared level of bargaining with the same determinant areas.
Six areas were statistically significant:

1) salary, 2) power

and authority, 3) job security, 4) fringe benefits, 5) role
definition and 6) decision making.
The two demographic factors found to be statistically
significant were:

District classification and District size.

After conducting an analysis of variance using these two
demographic variables,

the significant determinant working

condition areas effected by the demographic variables in both
the primary and secondary analysis were:

1)

autonomy,

2)

formal contracts, 3) salary, 4) role definition, 5) decision
making, and 6) power/authority.
The analysis of covariance revealed, even after adjusting
for the two covariates of district classification and district
size,

three working condition areas as still statistically

significant.

In the primary data analysis, there remained a

statistically significant difference between bargaining and
non-bargaining

principals

relative

hypothesis was therefore rejected.

to

autonomy.

The

null

This hypothesis states

there is no significant difference between the two principal
groups in the area of autonomy.
In

the

secondary

data

analysis,

there

remained

statistically significant difference between the level
bargaining
involvement

with

regard

to

the

in decision making,

determinants
job securi ty ,

of
and

a
of

salary,
fringe
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benefits.

In the secondary analysis, four sub-hypotheses were

also rejected.

These are:

1) There is no significant difference in the three levels
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of
salary.
2) There is no significant difference in the other levels
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of
involvement in decision making.
3) There is no significant difference in the three levels
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of
job security.
4) There is no significant difference in the three levels
of collective bargaining relative to the perception of
fringe benefits.
Chapter V reports the study's findings, conclusions and
recommendations based on the analysis provided in Chapter IV
are discussed.

CHAPTER V
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This

chapter

begins

with

a

review

of

statement, research design, and data analysis.

the

problem

It is followed

by a discussion of the study's findings and their implications
for

policy

and

practice.

The

chapter

concludes

with

suggestions for future research into collective bargaining for
educational administrators.
STUDY SUMMARY
Review of the Problem
The legitimacy of administrative collective bargaining
in public education has gained greater acceptance in recent
years.

Although collective bargaining for school principals

flourished during the sixties and seventies, during the last
fifteen years there have been very few changes or significant
developments

in collective bargaining

Correspondingly,

the

publics'

for

administrators.

attitude toward

educational

administration has been mixed as indicated in the review of
literature in Chapter II.
Organizational theory and the history of the American
Labor Movement have greatly influenced the right of school
principals
bargaining.

to

organize

for

the

purpose

of

collective

Various theories support the need for principals
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to achieve higher order need satisfactions.

Maslow's (1954)

theory is based on the idea that motivation is an eternal
force which cannot be imposed by external effort.
Herzberg

(1966)

found

satisfaction directly

that

from

contented

Frederick

workers

derived

job satisfiers and motivators.

Blau (1978) speaks to the "exchange theory" as the give and
take of services in exchange for wages and benefits.

The

assumption is that men seek to adjust social conditions to
achieve their ends is realistic and inescapable.

Specific

forms of social organization, such as unions are the result
of

the

exchange

process.

The

patterns

of

conduct

by

individuals or groups and their relations readjust through the
process of exchange and competition (Blau, 1978).
When school boards establish with principals the means
for openly discussing and acting on relevant concerns such as
wages, role definition, autonomy, and authority it may enhance
in principals, a greater sense of professional recognition and
esteem (Caldwell and Paul, 1983).
Principals in many school districts do not have the same
access to negotiated decision making as do their subordinates
(teachers) who are involved in collective bargaining (Caldwell
and Paul, 1983).

This decision making process with respect

to wages, benefits and self-interest is an acceptable practice
to

upper

management

organizations.

in

public

and

private

sector

In education, upper management (school boards

and superintendents) tend to hold more tightly to unilateral
one-sided decision making due to the negative public attitudes
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which

have

emerged

as

a

result

of

teacher

collective

bargaining.
Principals have used collective bargaining as a means of
accessing the decision making process to get greater input
with

respect

conditions.
bargaining

to

wages,

benefits,

and

overall

working

Many principals have felt pushed into collective
because

decisions

made

by

school

boards

have

adversely effected principals' jobs.
Teachers' roles in collective bargaining have also pushed
administrators

toward

a

collective bargaining model,

and

administrators see negotiations going on around them but
seldom with them.
teachers,

in

Bargaining between top management and

which

principals

do

not

participate,

has

undermined their prerogatives when viewing the gains made by
teachers

in salary and other welfare issues.

It is not

surprising that the process had appeal to principals.
The principal's role in school site management is putting
policy into practice.

Administering the teacher contract is

a major part of this policy management for principals, but
they have less authority than the teachers in developing the
bargaining process and the contract.
Principals are "caught
bargaining dynamics.
narrowly

defined

contract,

many

channels

of

input

of collective

Al though they are expected to administer

practices

do

in the middle"

not

have

to their

as

prescribed

direct

access

by
to

governing boards

the

teacher

formalized
in defining
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principals' working conditions, that the collective bargaining
process would bring.
bargaining process

However, participation in the collective
means

participating

in

an

adversarial

model.
Proponents of the "administrative team" concept feel it
is the major victim of principals'
bargain.

right to collectively

The adversarial aspects of bargaining make the

"administrative team" concept impossible to implement.
Collective bargaining for administrators in Oregon and
Washington differs based on the legal statutes within each
state.

In Oregon the legislature did not develop a statute

to encourage collective bargaining.
control

of

each

district

to

It was left to the local

determine

the

process.

In

Washington, a statute was developed and implemented with rules
and regulations guiding the collective bargaining process for
principals.
This study examined the perceptions of public school
principals

in

Oregon

and

Washington

regarding

working

conditions and analyzed the relationships between principals'
perceptions and their ability to collectively bargain.
From

a

review

of

the

social/behavioral

science

literature, two research questions were developed to guide the
study.
1)

Do

school

principals

who

can

legally

bargain

collectively for their working conditions perceive these
conditions differently than principals who can not?
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2)

What

is the

relationship between the

collective bargaining

and

public

school

level

of

principals'

perceptions of working conditions?
The research question which guided the study and from which
the primary hypothesis was developed was question number one.
From the

first

research question,

the

following

primary

research hypothesis was developed:
There is no significant difference in the perceptions of
bargaining

principals

and

non-bargaining

principals

regarding working conditions.
The following sub-hypotheses were developed to guide this
part of the study.

The primary analysis tested the following

sub-hypotheses:
1.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining principals and non-bargaining principals
regarding salary.
2.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non bargaining principals relative to
the existence of formal written contracts.
3.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to
autonomy.
4.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining principals as compared to non-bargaining
principals relative to power and authority.
5.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions
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bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to job
security.
6.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to
fringe benefits.
7.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to
role definition.
8.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals in the level
of communication with school boards and superintendents.
9.

There is no significant difference in the perceptions

of bargaining and non-bargaining principals relative to
their involvement in decision making.
The second research question which guided the study was:
What is the relationship between the level of collective
bargaining and public school principals' perceptions of
working conditions?
From the second question, the following secondary hypothesis
was developed:
There is no significant difference between the level of
bargaining of principals and their perceptions of working
conditions.
The following sub-hypotheses were developed from the
secondary hypothesis!
1.

There is no significant difference in the three
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levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of salary.
2.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of the existence of formal written contracts.
3.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of autonomy.
4.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of power and authority.
5.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of job security.
6.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of fringe benefits.
7.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of role definition.
S.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the

perception of the level of communication with the school
board and superintendent.
9.

There is no significant difference in the three

levels

of

collective

bargaining

relative

to

the
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perception of involvement in decision making.
Research Design
The

population

elementary,

for

middle

this

level,

and

study

consisted

secondary

of

public

all

school

principals in Oregon and Washington.
To insure the sample would be representative of all
school

principals,

utilized.

a

simple

random

sample

procedure

was

A list of all principals was obtained from the

Oregon and Washington state Departments of Education.
names on each list were consecutively numbered,

The

excluding

those principals who also served as superintendent in their
respective districts.

Using a computerized random numbers

chart for each list, a sample of one hundred principals from
each state was drawn.
The sample represented approximately ten percent of the
total population available for study.

Eighty (80) Washington

principals and sixty-seven (67) Oregon principals responded
to the questionnaire for an overall return rate of seventy
three and one half (73.5%) percent.

This sampling technique

enabled the investigator to learn more about the perceptions
of school principals in both Washington and Oregon.
Washington and Oregon were chosen in order to obtain
responses from principals in one state, who by state statute,
may collectively bargain and to compare their responses to
those of principals working in a state which does not have
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statutory authority for administrative collective bargaining.
Data were collected through use of the School Principal
Working

Conditions

Questionnaire.

This

instrument

was

developed by the researcher, adapted from a combination of the
Middle Management Working Conditions Questionnaire developed
by

williams

(1985),

and

Questionnaire •.• Non-Union
Questionnaire •.. Union

and

by

analyzed utilizing the

The

Morris

The

Principal

Attitude

Principal

Attitude

(1985).

All

data

were

SYSTAT (The System for Statistics)

microcomputer statistical package.
In analyzing the data, items pertaining to each of the
nine determinant areas of working conditions were grouped,
totaled and averaged.

A one-way analysis of variance was used

to compare the perceptions of bargaining and non-bargaining
principals in each of the nine determinant areas of working
conditions.

These data were not treated as ordinal, but were

collapsed to simUlate interval data and a one-way analysis of
variance technique was utilized to analyze the data set.
Respondents'

answers

were

grouped

into

categories

representing three levels of collective bargaining:

1)

formal collective bargaining, 2) informal, and 3) unilateral
decisions.

A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare

principals' responses.
When a demographic factor was found to significantly vary
between bargaining and non-bargaining principal groups, this
variable was used as a covariate and an analysis of covariance
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was conducted.

Analysis of covariance helped to explain the

effects of the primary independent variable (bargaining/non
bargaining) without the effect of the demographic factor.
FINDINGS
Results of the data analysis are reported in the order
the questions are stated:
1)

Do

school

principals

who

can

legally

bargain

collectively for their working conditions perceive these
conditions differently than principals who can not?
2)

What

is

collective

the

relationship

bargaining

and

between

public

the

school

level

of

principals'

perceptions of working conditions?
Question

one

guided

the

development

hypothesis addressed in the study:

of

the

primary

There is no significant

difference in the perceptions of bargaining principals versus
non-bargaining principals concerning working conditions.
To test this hypothesis, mean scores of the satisfaction
ratings of Washington principals were compared to the mean
scores of the ratings for Oregon principals in each of nine
determinant areas of working conditions.
that Washington principals

The data indicates

(legally authorized to bargain)

recorded higher mean scores than did Oregon principals (nonbargaining)
significant,

in
the

only

one

Existence

area
of

which
Formal

was

statistically

Contracts.

Oregon

principals recorded a significantly higher mean score than
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washington principals in the area of Autonomy.
the

analysis

of

variance

results,

the

According to
.05

level

of

significance was achieved in both of these areas (See Table
XI).

The results of the analysis of covariance, indicate only

the area of Autonomy was significant at the .05 level (see
Table XI).

There were no significant differences between the

two groups in the areas of 1) salary, 2) power and authority,
3) job security, 4) fringe benefits,S) role definition, 6)
communication, and 7) decision making.
There

still

remained

a

statistically

significant

difference relative to the variable of autonomy for the two
groups of principals.

Non-bargaining principals

(Oregon)

perceive the autonomy they possess in managing their buildings
to be higher than do bargaining principals (Washington).

The

explanation for this finding may be attributable to the notion
that collectively they have no impact upon district collective
bargaining processes but as school site managers, they are
able to make a difference in the education of children and
they do have impact on teacher behavior.

Another view may be

that decisions made at the district level have little or no
impact at the building level

and the principal has more

independence in all aspects of school management, including
working with the superintendent, regarding conditions of work.
Principals are more involved in all decisions which impact
them directly.

These decisions

working conditions,

may not directly

impact

but the principals involvement in the
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process affects their perceptions of autonomy.

There may not

be a division between the decision process regarding school
management and principals' business as in Washington, where
the decision making process regarding working conditions may
be different than other decision making processes.
The second research question, with regard to the level
of bargaining and its impact on principals' perceptions of
working conditions, guided the secondary hypothesis:

There

is no significant difference between the level of bargaining
of principals and their perceptions of working conditions.
A secondary analysis was conducted to determine levels of
bargaining which significantly impacted the perceptions of
principals working conditions.

Mean scores of principals'

responses to levels of bargaining were compared with the nine
determinant areas of working conditions.
and

covariance

statistically

indicated

significant.

only
For

four
the

Analyses of variance
determinants
formal

were

collective

bargaining group, the area of salary (.001) was significant.
Decision making (.030 level), job security (.013), and fringe
benefits (.016) were significant for the informal bargaining
group (see Table XI, Chapter IV).
There were no significant differences between the two
principal groups in the level of bargaining and the areas of
1) autonomy, 2) formal contracts, 3) power and authority, 4)
role definition, and 5) communication.
The relationship between formal bargaining and salary
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perceptions appears to be tightly coupled.
principals

who

indicated

they

significantly higher mean
indicated

an

informal

formally

score than

level

belonged to the unilateral

of

For example,

bargained

did

had

principals

bargaining

or

who

those

decision making group.

a

who
This

perception suggests that one factor which may contribute to
higher levels of satisfaction with the adequacy of salary for
principals

is

the

formal

collective

bargaining

process.

Anderson (1970) notes substantial gains in salary and other
welfare issues have been made by teachers through the formal
collective bargaining process.

This is similar to the results

indicated in the research by LeCesne (1980), where a positive
correlation between formalized bargaining and the degree of
satisfaction with adequacy of principals' salaries.
In the areas of involvement in decision making,
security,

and

claiming

to

fringe
have

benefits,

informal

the

levels

group
of

of

job

principals

bargaining

had

significantly higher mean scores than principals who indicated
a formal level of bargaining or those engaged in unilateral
decision making processes.

An explanation for this finding

is they are involved in the decision making process more often
or to a greater extent than those principals in the formal
and

unilateral

characteristic

levels
of

of

informal

bargaining.

This

bargaining

processes

may

be

which

incorporate the "administrative team" concept.
As

in

the

area

of

involvement

in

decision

making,
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principals' participation in informal bargaining may bring
about

greater

superintendent

interaction
or

school

between

board

in

the

principals

establishing

and

specific

policies and procedures that principals perceive to impact
their job security.

This interaction can offer increased

opportunities for professional growth for all members of the
team.

Increased collaboration can lead to an increase in the

professionalism of the team and bring about greater fringe
benefi ts.

Principals

benefits,

in this study reported more

includil1g professional

memberships,

fringe

leaves,

and

professional growth opportunities, through informal bargaining
processes.
An informal process or administrative team concept allows
for greater interaction between groups.

This interaction may

result

higher

in

participants

perceiving

degrees

of

involvement in managerial decision making as well as greater
degrees of involvement in decisions which impact upon working
conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
The data from this study indicate that principals who
have legal authority to bargain collectively do not perceive
their working conditions to
principals who cannot bargain.
of

working

conditions,

be significantly better than
Only one of nine determinants

autonomy,

was

found

statistically

significant (see Table XI, Chapter IV), and it was higher for
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non-bargaining principals.
A major
significant

conclusion
differences

of

study

this

Oregon

between

principals relative to working conditions.
factors

is

which might contribute to

there
and

no

washington

There are several

the perceived

difference between the two groups of principals.
is the bargaining level of the principals
Chapter IV).

are

lack of
The first

(see Table II,

There is little difference in the perceptions

of principals in each of the three bargaining level groups formal,

informal,

and

unilateral

decision

making.

Principals' responses in both states reveal a similar pattern
even though statutory authority for formal bargaining differs
greatly in each state.
Another

factor which may contribute to

the

lack of

significant differences between Oregon and Washington is the
progressiveness of the educational systems in both states
relative to level of bargaining.

Both states' largest group

of respondents were principals who had an informal level of
bargaining.

This "getting to yes" style of bargaining is

coming into vogue for teacher negotiations as well as in
administrative negotiations.

The current trend is away from

adversarial bargaining and there may be a comparable decline
in interest in formal bargaining by principals.

In the 1990' s

administrator collective bargaining may not be the preferred
strategy by principals.
A third factor which may explain the similarities of both
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principal

groups

is

a

satisfaction with

current

working

conditions and a corresponding view that teacher groups are
not continuing to make substantive gains in either salary or
other welfare issues.

The needs that have traditionally led

principals to organize may not be there now (Barea, 1978) and
job satisfaction may be at higher levels.

As indicated in the

study by Sweeney and Rowedder (1982), principals reporting
greater satisfaction with
strongly pro-union.

a:3.laries

This study,

and benefits were

not

of Oregon and washington

principals, concurs with the findings of Nasstrom and Pier
(1983) and Morris (1985), who concluded principals who have
statutory authority to collectively bargain do not perceive
their working conditions to be significantly more positive
than principals who do not have this authority.
The findings indicate the level of collective bargaining
has some effect on the principals' perceptions of working
conditions but not at a

statistically significant

level.

These conclusions, and those which follow, are drawn from the
data which show that salary, involvement in decision making,
job

security,

statistically

and

fringe

significant

benefits
factors

were

with

found
regard

to
to

be
the

principals' level of bargaining.
The data indicates that principals who formally bargain
have higher scores on adequacy of salary scales than the other
two respondent groups.
by LeCesne

(1980),

In support of the research conclusions

Caldwell

(1981),

Sweeney and Rowedder
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(1982), and Nasstrom and Pier (1983), there appears to be a
positive

relationship

interaction

between

between

the

principals

relative to contractual items.

and

degree
their

of

formalized

school

boards

This formalization results in

a significantly more positive perception of salary adequacy.
Principals

perceive higher

levels

of

involvement

in

decision making, job security, and fringe benefits through the
informal bargaining process over the formal level.

This may

be attributed to the implementation of an "administrative
team"

concept

and

a

shared

power

structure

in

which

principals have greater latitude and involvement in decision
making.

The idea is to involve principals in more decisions

including those which effect their working conditions.
formalized

model

may

also

alleviate

relationships in collective bargaining

the

A less

adversarial

(Caldwell and Paul,

1983 and Kowalski, 1978), and make the school board and/or the
superintendent more comfortable in joining forces with an
administrative team.
This "shared power" or "informal" structure may prove
superior to the adversarial aspects of formal bargaining and
make the achievement of a true administrative team possible.
In Washington and Oregon, both the Confederation of Oregon
School Administrators (COSA), Washington Association of School
Administrators (WASA) and the Association of Washington School
Principals (AWSP) are supporters of the administrative team
concept.
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Previous research on administrative collective bargaining
has generally concluded that principals who are involved in
formal or informal collective bargaining (whether or not this
activity is permitted by state statute)

have more positive

perceptions of their working conditions.
found

mean

scores

on

working

This study also

conditions

sub-scales

for

principals in the informal and formal bargaining groups to be
higher than those for principals in the unilateral decision
making group.
IMPLICATIONS
Policy
Many legislative bodies are currently debating the issue
of collective bargaining for administrators.
evaluating

collective

implementation.

bargaining

Legislators are

statutes

and

their

The findings of this study provide data which

can inform those responsible for the development of such
statutes.

The data may be persuasive for the development of

statutes which insure that the statutes have language that
focuses on interactive practices which will encourage school
boards,

superintendents and principals to employ a two-way

communication strategy for decision making wi th regard to
working

conditions.

An

administrative

team

model

could

enhance professionalism for all groups involved in educational
decision making.
Local policy makers could establish this type of policy
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at the local level within their school board policies and
procedures to insure involvement by principals in matters that
relate

specifically to working conditions.

An effective

administrative team model may have an even broader scope to
include

a

"shared

power

model"

which

could

be

truly

representative of a participatory management model.
Practice
Those

responsible

for

implementing

policy,

the

practitioners, could benefit from this study's findings that
the formalization

of collective bargaining may not be as

important as the actual practice of involvement of principals
in establishing procedures in the area of job security and the
types of benefits principals' receive.

As Caldwell

(1981)

found in his study, the actual process through which working
conditions are determined is more crucial in job satisfaction
than the actual level of the conditions.
Theory
Principal involvement is establishing conditions of work
is based on the idea of meeting the basic needs of principals
so that they are able to achieve the maximum effectiveness
permitted by their abilities and skills (Lutrin, 1985).

When

school boards establish with principals the means of openly
discussing and acting on relevant concerns, it enhances the
principals' sense of professional recognition (Caldwell and
Paul, 1983).
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According

to

Blau

(1978)

in

the

collective organization mobilizes power.

exchange

theory,

Also, a person or

group who commands services other's need, attains power over
others.

If there is an imbalance in the power level, there

will be an uneven exchange between the groups.

School boards,

by not anticipating in advance the social regards or needs
which principals will or can reciprocate in the exchange
relationship, inevitably will bring error and uncertainty into
the relationship of the groups (Blau, 1978).

Blau's exchange

theory (1978) can be used as a conceptual model for collective
bargaining.
"give

and

benefits.

This exchange theory can be referred to as the
take"

of

services

in

exchange

for

wages

The assumption is that people seek to adjust social

conditions to achieve their ends.

Specific forms of social

organization are the result of the exchange process
1978) •

and

(Blau,

Union organization is an example of this form of

social organization.

The patterns of conduct by individuals

or groups and their relations readjust through the process of
exchange and competition according to Blau

(1978).

This

pattern of conduct could be the informal or formal process of
collective bargaining.
Providing a model which encourages discussion and input
by the school board,

superintendent and principals before

final decisions with regard to working conditions are made
helps avoid an imbalance in power

lev~ls.

groups can experience gratification.

Subsequently, both

120

Limitations
There

were

limitations

corrected in future studies.

on

this

study

which

may

be

First, sampling for the study

was limited to a survey of a specific geographical population.
Therefore, it is recommended this study be replicated using
a larger number of Oregon and Washington school principals in
order

to

have

more

generalizable

data

perceptions of their working condi tions.

about

principals'

Second,

in the

secondary analysis, a planned comparison could be made between
the

three

levels

of

bargaining

significance between the

formal

informal bargaining group.

to

further

determine

bargaining group

and the

This planned comparison can only

be done if certain data are known ahead of time and the
statistical analysis is planned.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The

1.

nationwide
principals.

findings

survey

of

of

this

collective

study

become

bargaining

part

statutes

of

a

for

There are elements in this study and in previous

studies that are consistent.

However, future studies might

show different trends if, for example, principal collective
bargaining studies were conducted in each state.
2.

Studies examining successful labor processes, other

than collective bargaining,

are needed.

A review of the

literature indicates principals want involvement in decision
making about working conditions, but no where is it cited that

121

the vehicle must be formal collective bargaining.

There may

be other labor relations models utilized by school board
members which take into account the needs of principals,
school boards, teachers, students, and parents.

These models

may be more effective than the existing adversarial collective
bargaining model.

The data for this study revealed a greater

number of respondents were involved
bargaining.

in informal

types of

Both groups chose strategies other than formal

bargaining, whether or not they had access to more formal
procedures.

Therefore, a question for further research could

be, "If formal collective bargaining is not the best means of
setting working conditions for school principals, what model
or process best meet the needs of this professional group?"
3.

Many Oregon respondents reported they were involved

in some aspect of collective bargaining even though there is
no

statutory

authority

for

these

bargaining

activities.

Oregon principals' knowledge of collective bargaining statutes
and their perceptions of administrative collective bargaining
needs

further

probing.

A

descriptive

study

of

Oregon

principal's perceptions of formal collective bargaining and
the process they use for categorization needs to be conducted.
Such a study would help clarify the bargaining processes being
employed throughout the state.
4.

A study designed to compare the roles of middle

managers in other fields and school principals may provide
insight

r------

into

the

human

relations

aspect

of

future
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organizational dynamics in education.

such a study could be

designed to answer the research question "00 middle managers
in fields other than education have a model they use to reach
agreement on issues specific to their working conditions?
Does this model involve the middle managers in the decision
making process?"
5.

The demographic data for this study was only tested

for significance with regard to the independent variable of
bargaining

(Washington)

and

non-bargaining

(Oregon)

principals.

A further investigation of these factors with

regard to the nine determinants of working conditions may
provide some interesting findings.
6.

Finally,

a

further

investigation

into

the

reasonableness of changing state statutes to move toward an
administrative team concept or shared power model, relative
to collective bargaining of principals' working conditions,
is needed.

An initial study to survey legislators about their

attitudes regarding collective bargaining and administrative
team structures would be an initial step in this line of
inquiry.

The

education

profession

could

benefit

from

information about the "reasonableness" of proposing any kind
of change in statutes in either Oregon or Washington.
Further

study

should

also

seek

to

identify

those

districts which use an administrative team model with regard
to

conditions

of

bargaining model.

work

rather

than

a

formal

collective

This should be done after pin-pointing the
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contextual factors, as well as the structures and processes
which influence principals in districts using this model.

The

investigator could work with COSA, WASA and AWSP to develop
legislative

proposals

for

shaping

administrative

team

statutes.
SUMMARY

This

chapter

comparing

provides

bargaining

a

and

summary

of

the

non-bargaining

perceptions of working condi tions.

research

principals'

The study' s

findings

indicate non-bargaining principals (Oregon) perceive autonomy
at higher levels than do bargaining principals (Washington).
Oregon principals

when

compared to washington

principals

perceive themselves as having greater authority over teachers
and school building activities.

All the other determinants

of working conditions were not found to be statistically
significant.
bargaining

Overall,
was

found

the existence of formal collective
to

have

no

significant

impact

on

principals' perceptions of their working conditions.
A secondary data analysis found the determinants of 1)
salary,
benefits

2)

decision making 3)
to

bargaining.

be

significant

job security, and 4)
relative

to

the

fringe

level

of

Principals who formally bargain perceive higher

levels of satisfaction with the adequacy of their salary
levels than do those principals who informally bargain or who
accept unilateral decisions.
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Principals who bargain informally perceive higher levels
of involvement in decision making, job security, and fringe
benefits than do principals who formally bargain or accept
unilateral

decisions.

These principals

report

they are

involved in setting policy more often or to greater degrees
than the other two respondent groups.

They also perceive

higher levels of job security and fringe benefits.

The other

five determinants of working conditions were not found to be
statistically significant relative to the level of bargaining.
Overall, the effect of the level of bargaining with regard to
working conditions of principals was not significant.
This study's major finding that principals in Washington,
who by statute are allowed to bargain collectively, do not
perceive they enjoy significant advantages regarding working
conditions when compared with Oregon principals, who do not
have collective bargaining rights.

This major finding has

powerful implications for the collective bargaining movement
and for principals in the Northwest.
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12213 S. E. Riveridge Drive
Vancouver, WA
98684

February 2, 1988
Dear Colleague:
hhat you are about to read you have read many times
before ••• however,
X believe, the end will justify ~bg
neans. PLEASE READ ON!
I aD a Diddle school principal in the Camas School District, in
CaQas, washingt~n, and a doctoral student at portland State
University.
I aD doing research with Or. John Heflin, my
advisor, in the area of "Collective Bargaining for Educational
Administrators: Oregon and Washington principals' Perceptions of
horking Conditions."
=:nclosed you .,ill find a brief questionnaire.
Ox ai:l requesting
you take 10 to· 15 Dinutes out of your busy schedule to complete
it.
You:: candid response is greatly needed if. this research is
to be successful.
I have enclosed a self addressed, stamped
envelope :for your convenience and would ver}· J:iuch appreciate your
return by February 12.
Since there are so~e delicate issues addressee, all returns will
be :':ept 1n the strictest. confidence. Upon co::pletiun of the
. s-:udy , i ! you WOUld. be interested. in seeing· a . sn-;;an.- C?f the
resul-:s, ! lOould be happy to share this ",ith you. Si&:ply d=op ~e
a nc~e rs~esting this information with your na::e anc address and
:~~ ~ill receive a copy.
O£cur prc::pt
success of

return of this questionnaire is crucial to the
cy study.
Your completion e: the enclosed
ques~ion::aire is indication of your consent to parcicipate in
this stu=v.
I have enclosed a Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream
certifica~e as a "thank-you" and a token of ny appreciation for
your assistance in this research project.
!:o·... , doesn't this end justify the means. (If you are not totally
satisfie:, please return the coupon for a full refund.)
!"han:': yc:: for your cooperation.

~~J&.,
?atricia A. Boles

=:nclcsurss:

Business Card
Baskin-Robbins Gift Certificate
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February 12, 1988
Dear Colleague,
Just a reminder that I have not as yet received the
survey I sent you on February 2.
Your input is
greatly needed for a
successful study of
"Principals I Perceptions of Working Conditions in
regards to Collective Bargaining in Oregon and
Washington.
If you have already mailed your survey, thank you!
I realize what a busy time of year this is and how
stressful one more ~equest can be. If you have not
done so, would you please complete and return the
questionnaire as soon as possible. The survey is
short and should take very little of your time.
I am very grateful for your help.

~:~:~~

Patricia Boles
Doctoral candidate, Portland State University
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QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions for completing questionnaire
The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine
working conditions within your district and the degree of
your satisfaction with these conditions.
1.

state

i~

which you work (check one)

Washington
Oregon
2.

School district classification (check one)
Urban
Suburban
Small Town
Rural

3.

School district student population (check one)

o - 999
1000 - 4999
5000 - larger
4.

Date Of Birth

5.

Sex (check one)
Male
Female

6.

Number of years in public school administration

7.

Years of classroom teaching experience

8.

Position (check one)
Secondary Principal
Middle Level Principal
Elementary Principal

~--
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Please check the category/categories which best describe the
process which results in determining salaries and working
conditions for principals in your district: (Please check
only one)
Formal collective bargaining between the
superintendent and representatives of
middle management.
_____ Formal collective bargaining between
representatives of the school board and
principals
Informal meetings between the superintendent
/board and principals
_____ unilateral decisions by the superintendent/board
communicated to principals
_____ other (Please specify)
Each of the following items makes a statement about
administrative collective bargaining in the public schools.
Please read each statement carefully and then mark according
to the following scale:
4 - strongly agree
3 - Agree

*

Means

2 - Disagree
1 - Strongly
Disagree

1.88

1.

Administrative collective bargaining negatively
effects the administrator's relationship with the
teachers.

2.20

2.

Administrative collective bargaining negatively
effects the administrator's relationship with the
superintendent.

2.21

3.

Administrative collective bargaining negatively
effects the administrator's relationship with the
school board.

1.92

4.

Administrative collective bargaining negatively
effects the conditions of work for an
administrator.

1.90

5.

Administrative collective bargaining negatively
effects the control an administrator has over
their job responsibilities.
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Each item on this questionnaire makes a statement about the
management in your schools. Please read each statement
carefully. Then indicate the extent to which each stated
condition actually exists in your school district, according
to the following scale:
4 - To a large extent
3 - To a moderate extent

*

Means
3.09 1.

2 - To a slight
extent
1 - Not at all

An effective communication system exists between
and among all levels of the management team.

3.06

2.

Administrators meet periodically with the
Superintendent to discuss their problems.

2.28

3.

Administrators meet periodically with school
directors to discuss their problems.

3.33

4.

Administrators have adequate opportunities to
attend state conferences or conventions.

2.98

5.

Administrators feel free to speak out at
administrative meetings even if their views are
contrary to the Superintendent or Board.

2.78

6.

There is wide involvement of administrators in the
development of the school district budget.

3.36

7.

Administrators have an opportunity to make
appropriate input to employment decisions
concerning school district employees.

3.30

8.

Input from administrators is solicited as proposed
administrative rules and regulations are being
developed.

2.80

9.

Administrators are represented on the board's
negotiating team.

3.40

10. Job descriptions have been prepared for all
administrators.

3.17

11. The district conducts formal performance
appraisals with the administrators on a regular
basis.

2.63

12. The district has a fair and logical procedure for
determining salaries for administrators.
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2.87

13. Salaries for administrators compare favorably with
their counterparts in similar districts.

3.00

14. The district has a fair and logical procedure for
determining fringe benefits for administrators.

2.96

15. Fringe benefits for administrators compare
favorably with their counterparts in similar
districts.

3.68

16. Employment contracts have been provided for every
administrator.

3.17

17. Collective administrator contracts are not changed
without mutual consent.

2.64

18. The district has a staff development program for
administrators.

2.58

19. Administrators feel free to implement new plans or
policies for their schools or program
responsibilities without involving a
superior.

2.77

20. The district has defined, written hiring
procedures for principals.

1.93

21. A written defined grievance procedure for
administrators is in place.

3.50

22. There is a defined, written work year for the
principals in the district.

3.25

23. The district has a defined, written salary
structure for the principals.

2.75

24. Written procedures defining leaves of absence have
been developed for all administrators.

3.40

25. Administrators meet periodically with the
superintendent to resolve problems.

1.86

26. Administrators meet periodically with the school
board to resolve problems.

2.61

27. Administrators have adequate opportunities to
attend national conferences or conventions.

3.09

28. Administrators feel free to speak out at
administrative meetings.
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3.01

29. There is wide involvement of administrators in the
development of their school's building budget.

2.84

30. Administrators have an opportunity to make
appropriate input to promotion decisions
concerning school district employees.

3.32

31. Administrators have an opportunity to make
appropriate input to dismissal decisions
concerning school district employees.

2.83

32. Administrators have input to administrative job
descriptions.

COMMENTS:
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR BARGAINING AND NON-BARGAINING
PRINCIPAL'S PERCEPTION REGARDING THE NINE
PRIMARY HYPOTHESES.
Work
Conditions

Mult.
R

Sq.
Mult.
R

Signf.
p=<.05

Sum
of
Sq.

Mean
Sq.

Salary

.014

.000

Formal Contracts

.205

.042

0.015

2.165

2.165

Antonomy

.232

.054

0.006

4.163

4.163

Power/Authority

.053

.003

0.545

Job Security

.036

.001

0.681

Fringe Benefits

.036

.001

0.671

Role Definition

.026

.001

0.748

Communication

.035

.001

0.688

Decision Making

.118

.014

0.162

0.869
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PRINCIPAL'S LEVEL OF BARGAINING
AND THE NINE SECONDARY HYPOTHESES.
Work
Conditions

Mult.
R

Sq.
Mult.
R

Sum
of
Sq.

Mean
Sq.

Salary

.380

.144

11. 267

5.634

Formal Contracts

.028

.001

0.950

Antonomy

.186

.035

0.104

Power/Authority

.248

.061

3.542

1. 771

0.022

Job Security

.264

.070

4.131

2.066

0.013

Fringe Benefits

.247

.061

11.687

5.843

0.016

Role Definition

.230

.053

3.833

1.917

0.030

Communication

.073

.005

Decision Making

.293

.086

Signf.
p=<.05

0.000

0.715
4.460

2.230

0.003
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION AND
SIGNIFICANT WORKING CONDITIONS.
Mult.
R

Sq.
Mult.
R

Sum
of
Sq.

Mean
Sq.

Signf.
p=<.05

Primary Analysis
Bargain/Non-Bargain
Autonomy

.253

.064

4.978

1.659

0.027

Formal Contracts

.278

.077

3.985

1.328

0.011

Salary

.388

.150

12.805

4.268

.000

Role Definition

.436

.190

16.187

5.396

.000

Decision Making

.253

.064

3.631

1.210

.028

Secondary Analysis
Level of Bargaining
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DISTRICT SIZE AND SIGNIFICANT
WORKING CONDITIONS.
Mult.
R

Sq.
Mult.
R

Sum
of
Sq.

Mean
Sq.

1.340

Signf.
p=<.05

Primary Analysis
Bargain/Non-Bargain
Formal Contracts

0.025

.228

.052

2.680

Salary

.363

.132

11.230

5.615

0.000

Power/Authority

.209

.044

2.816

1.409

0.055

Role Definition

.392

.153

12.985

6.493

0.000

Secondary Analysis
Level of Bargaining
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ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE: EFFECT OF DISTRICT CLASSIFICATION
AND DISTRICT SIZE ON THE SIGNIFICANT WORKING
CONDITION AREAS.

Mult.
R

Sq.
Mult.
R

Sum
of
Sq.

.101

3.284

Mean
Sq.

Signf.
p=<.05

Primary Analysis
Bargain/Non-Bargain
Autonomy

.318

3.284

0.012

3.656

0.001

2.205

0.003

Secondary Analysis
Level of Bargaining
Salary

.490

.240

Decision Making

.345

.119

7.313

